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INTRODUCTION
Virtually every employee is familiar with the workplace bulletin board
festooned with government notices. That workplace rules and rights are thus
communicated is a foregone conclusion. So it is odd that a new rule proposing
a workplace poster for labor rights would be vociferously opposed1 and that the
dispute would culminate in fierce multi-circuit litigation.2 But if the recent
attempt to require National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) notice posting3 ultimately falls flat, this rather unremarkable issue could prove the last straw for
the beleaguered National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).4 Union strength has
already reached its nadir,5 and the Board has long been the target of criticism
by business, unions, and legal scholars.6 If business and employer interests
invalidate this modest rule, U.S. industrial democracy as we know it may end
1 Dave Jamieson, Wilma Liebman, Outgoing NLRB Chair, Finds “Silver Lining” in Political Rancor, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 5, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/09/05/wilma-liebman-nlrb-chairwoman-interview_n_947258.html (“Liebman found
[the reaction to the poster rule] ‘kind of silly,’ given all the hoopla over 11-by-17-inch
placards.”).
2 The NLRB was sued in 2011 by the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, National Right to Work Foundation, and others, resulting in opposing decisions in South Carolina and D.C. District Courts in 2012, culminating in D.C. and
4th Circuit appeals in 2013 and a distinct possibility of U.S. Supreme Court review. See
Order granting emergency injunction pending appeal, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 125068, 2012 WL 4328371, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 2012) (granting an emergency injunction
that was denied below against the NLRB); see also Order granting injunctive relief to plaintiffs, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780 (D.S.C. 2012) (granting an
injunction against the NLRB).
3 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
4 Protecting worker rights has long been a struggle, but most recently, the NLRB has had
difficulty simply maintaining a quorum for day-to-day adjudications. See Steven Greenhouse, More Than 300 Labor Board Decisions Could Be Nullified, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2013, at A10; see also Dorian T. Warren, The American Labor Movement in the Age of
Obama: The Challenges and Opportunities of a Racialized Political Economy, 8 PERSP. ON
POL. 847, 849–50 (2010) (discussing the political causes for increasing NLRB weakness);
see also Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Relations Act Was Stolen and How It
Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National Labor Relations Board’s
Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 5–6 (2012).
5 Private-sector union density was 6.6% in 2012, the lowest level since the NLRB was
established. See infra Section I.B.
6 See, e.g., ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE
ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 4–5 (2006) (discussing why even union leaders are so negative
about the NLRA and NLRB: “The AFL-CIO’s Web site is full of condemnations of the
NLRA and NLRB as worthless” and quoting former President of the United Mine Workers
of America Richard Trumka, who described the NLRB as “clinically dead” in 1992 and
advised Congress to abolish the NLRA). See also Morris, supra note 4, at 5 (“[T]he Board is
simply ineffective—in other words broken. It does not adequately enforce the Act’s core
provisions”).
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“[n]ot with a bang but a whimper.”7 On the other hand, affirmation of the
notice-posting rulemaking would mark a turning point for the Board, providing
latitude for other broadly applicable labor rules8 and offering greater policy
stability in the controversial realm of industrial relations.9
Substantively, the 2011 notice-posting rule sought to raise employee
awareness of labor rights under the NLRA;10 procedurally, the rule was a
much-needed foray into administrative rulemaking for the NLRB.11 Because
defeat of both objectives would be a devastating blow for labor law, the dispute
is worthy of wide-ranging and nuanced analysis. This Note endeavors to place
the NLRA notice-posting controversy into a historic context by examining it
through four different lenses: labor law, administrative rulemaking, economic
theory, and management practice. In so doing, this Note seeks to emphasize the
significance of labor rights, workplace information, and unionization at a critical juncture for industrial democracy.
First, this Note sets the controversy in its legal context. In 2010, the NLRB
decided that informing employees of their statutory rights was fundamental to
employees’ exercise of those rights.12 The Board developed the notice-posting
rule to fill both a statutory gap and an actual awareness gap attributable to
dwindling union density.13 Following notice and comment, the NLRB
announced the final rule in August 2011 and met immediate legal challenge
from business and employer groups.14 Section I explains the background of the
NLRA rights in dispute and describes the modern industrial relations context
7

T.S. ELIOT, The Hollow Men, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 56, 59 (1952).
Abigail Rubenstein, NLRB’s Rulemaking Power Hinges on Union Poster Case, LAW 360
(Sept. 10, 2012, 10:36 PM), www.law360.com/articles/376777/nlrb-s-rulemaking-powerhinges-on-union-poster-case.
9 See Emerging Trends at the NLRB: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Education and the
Workforce Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions, 112th Cong. 3 (2011)
[hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Cynthia L. Estlund, Catherine A. Rein Professor of Law,
N.Y.U. School of Law), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/02.11.11_
estlund.pdf.
10 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30,
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
11 Hearing, supra note 9, at 2–3. See also Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The
NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2079 (2009); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at
the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 178–81 (1985).
12 Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 75 Fed.
Reg. 80,410–11 (Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
13 See id. Union density refers to the percentage of the labor force that is unionized.
THOMAS HYCLAK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 310 (2005).
14 Lawsuits and fuming public statements followed the Notice of Final Rule on August 30,
2011. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber Sues NLRB to
Block Notification Rule (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.uschamber.com/press/
releases/us-chamber-sues-nlrb-block-notification-rule; Press Release, Anthony Riedel, Nat’l
Right to Work Legal Def. Found., Inc., Worker Advocate Files Motion in Federal Labor
Board Posting Notice Case (Oct. 26 2011) [hereinafter Riedel, Press Release], available at
http://www.nrtw.org/en/press/2011/10/worker-advocate-files-motion-nlrb-notification-1026
2011; Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Manufacturers File Lawsuit to Stop NLRB’s
Overreach (Sept. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Press Release], available at
http://www.nam.org/communications/articles/2011/09/manufacturers-file-lawsuit-to-stopnlrbs-overreach.aspx.
8
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necessitating greater awareness of employee rights. Section II discusses the
development, promulgation, and ongoing litigation about the posting rule.
Next, the Board’s promulgation of the notice-posting rule marked a significant departure from an almost exclusively adjudicatory function into administrative rulemaking. Scholars and courts have long urged the Board to act
through rulemaking,15 so judicial validation of this rule would affirm a new
modus operandi and revitalize the dated labor law regime.16 Section III discusses the Board’s history with rulemaking and recent judicial review of the
Board’s authority to promulgate the notice-posting rule.
Finally, this Note offers economics and management insight to elucidate
structural and practical dynamics underlying the notice-posting controversy.
Section IV examines unions in their macroeconomic and microeconomic contexts. Economic theory explains that it is rational for firms to oppose union
activity,17 and union power is a “countervailing” force against corporations,18
but “information asymmetries” render labor markets “always and everywhere
imperfect,”19 so workplace information is a key economic issue. Section V
looks at some of the management realities surrounding workplace communication. Companies’ human resources and communications departments seek to
improve the quality of employee relations20 at the same time that intense management opposition to unions and a whole “union-busting” industry are key
factors in declining union density.21 Given the current reality of workplace
communication, an NLRB notice would be a mere drop in an ocean of management communication.
There seems much to gain in communicating NLRA rights to employees,
especially in a nation whose citizens proudly claim, understand, and exercise a
host of civil rights. This Note unreservedly supports the new notice-posting rule
as essential to democracy in the workplace and an effective economy. One
poster will not, by itself, save U.S. labor law, but affirmation of this NLRB
rulemaking could lead to a much-needed invigoration of statutory labor rights.

15 See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 11, at 178–81; Fisk & Malamud, supra note 11, at 2079;
Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE
L.J. 274, 274–75 (1991); Cornelius J. Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 254, 260 (1969).
16 Rubenstein, supra note 8 (“[T]he stakes [are] high for the board and for employers since
the outcome of the cases could ultimately decide the board’s ability to engage in broad
rulemaking in the future.”).
17 Morris M. Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance: Understanding the Decline of
Unionization in the Private Sector, 22 J. LAB. RES. 519, 522 (2001).
18 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 115 (1956).
19 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call
for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 780 (2011) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice].
20 There is abundant advice on employee relations in the management, human resources,
industrial relations, and communications literature. I cite to this literature in Section V.A.
21 See Kleiner, supra note 17, at 519.
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I. NLRA LABOR RIGHTS—BACKGROUND
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, also known as the
Wagner Act, is the federal statute that regulates private-sector labor-management relations in the United States, and it thereby affects more than 100 million
workers.22 The crux of this Note relates to section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities . . . .23

The Act recognized that protecting the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively would promote the flow of commerce by not only removing sources of industrial strife and encouraging the friendly adjustment of
industrial disputes, but also restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.24 The NLRA provides in section 3 that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) will ensure that employers and unions25 respect
the exercise of employees’ rights under the NLRA.26 Section 8 designates certain actions of employers and labor organizations as unfair labor practices, section 9 outlines procedures for representative elections, and section 10
empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices.27
A. History, Constitutionality, and Context of NLRA Rights
Early cases affirmed the constitutionality of NLRA rights. In 1937, the
Supreme Court declared section 7 of the NLRA to be “a fundamental right” in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.28 “Employees have as clear a right to
organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent
has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents.”29 Shortly
after the Supreme Court validation of the NLRB, the Seventh Circuit held in
Jefferson Electric Co. v NLRB,30 that the right of workers to organize was “a
natural right of equal rank with the great right of free speech, protected by the
22

Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2012 (Jan. 23, 2013),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [hereinafter BLS 2012].
23 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). (Section 7 of the NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157. Therefore, section 7 and § 157 are used interchangeably in court and academic discussions of the
NLRA because they represent the same statutory language of the NLRA. The same nomenclature applies to other provisions of the NLRA).
24 Id. § 151.
25 The Taft-Hartley Act added unfair labor practices by unions, among other amendments to
the NLRA. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2012).
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 156 (2012). See also Notification of Employee Rights Under the
NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (requiring
employers and labor organizations “to post notices informing their employees of their rights
as employees under the NLRA”).
27 29 U.S.C. §§ 158–60 (2012).
28 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
29 Id.
30 Jefferson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1939).
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Constitution.”31 Later, in Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,32 the same court regarded
such employee rights as “not a Congress-created right but the recognition of a
constitutional right, which Congress provided the means to protect.”33
Former NLRB Chairman Wilma Liebman34 has noted that the explicit premise of the New Deal-era labor law was to stimulate the economy, and the
NLRA was enacted less as a favor to labor, than to “save capitalism from
itself” by introducing a system of governance to resolve decades of bitter disputes and industrial strife.35 Of course, the country had only recently emerged
from the Great Depression, “widely viewed as a failure of capitalism.”36 Union
membership and collective bargaining gradually became an established part of
American economic life,37 and private-sector union density peaked around
thirty-six percent in 1953.38 Congress passed other worker-protection statutes
subsequent to the NLRA, largely as a result of union influence.39
Mid-century, legal protections for labor were scaled back in response to
perceived abuses by strong unions in the post-World War II period.40 The
NLRA was substantially amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, which
emphasized the section 7 right not to organize or engage in concerted activity
and added a host of union unfair labor practices to complement the original
employer unfair labor practices under section 8. Taft-Hartley also authorized
state “right to work” laws and national emergency presidential provisions.41
The last significant congressional amendment to labor law occurred with the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, which imposed a regime to regulate internal
union affairs but merely tinkered with the NLRA provisions.42 Since then, the
political sensitivity of labor relations has rendered Congress “relatively incapa31

Id. at 956.
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), aff’d, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
33 Id. at 258.
34 Wilma Liebman served on the NLRB from 1997–2011. See Board Members Since 1935,
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited May 3,
2013).
35 Wilma B. Liebman, Labor Law During Hard Times: Challenges on the 75th Anniversary
of the National Labor Relations Act, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2010).
36 Barry T. Hirsch, Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial
Competition Coexist?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 155 (2008).
37 See ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920–1985, at 137
(1986).
38 Hirsch, supra note 36, at 156 (“There is no definitive, fully time-consistent series on
union density.”); but see Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 775 (union density peaked at 33.2% in 1955).
39 Wilma B. Liebman, The Revival of American Labor Law, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
291, 308 (2010).
40 KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE
66–67 (2009) (workers felt they had sacrificed more than employers during wartime, and
responded with unprecedented strike activity—1946 saw 5,000 strikes involving 4.6 million
workers); see also Hirsch, supra note 36, at 155 (“Following World War II, high inflation
and strike activity shifted majority opinion toward support for greater limits on union
power.”).
41 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 68–71.
42 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1535 (2002). For example, the Act was amended in 1974, but that amendment merely
extended NLRA coverage to employees of health care institutions. Id. at n.32.
32
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ble of amending the NLRA.”43 The text has been virtually untouched due to
“longstanding political impasse”44 and labor law has “stood still in the face of
decades of social, economic, and legal change[.]”45 Congress essentially gave
up on reforming the collective-action model and shifted focus to an individualrights model to regulate the workplace.46
A key clarification is helpful at this point. Labor law governs labor management relations primarily (but by no means exclusively47) in unionized workplaces, and protects the rights of workers to engage in collective bargaining and
other forms of concerted activity.48 In contrast, employment law encompasses a
body of federal, state, and common law regarding individual employment
rights.49 This dichotomy is somewhat peculiar to the United States.50 There is a
“veritable alphabet soup” of individual employment rights legislation.51 The
most familiar federal statutes include the Civil Rights Act of 1964, OSHA,
FLSA, ADA, and FMLA, and there are also state statutes. But such regimes are
not a cure-all: individual employment rights laws place a growing regulatory
burden on employers, result in overlapping protections, and provide only minimal, standard terms.52 Often these statutory rights have limited effect because
individual employees have difficulty enforcing them.53 Scholars have pointed
out that many management-side attorneys actually prefer the NLRA legal structure to the individual employment rights regime,54 and applaud the “genius” of
labor rights as providing flexible, workplace-centered bargaining between the
parties themselves55: “Employees often know better than Washington bureaucrats how to improve their workplace.”56
B. Declining Unionization and Income Inequality
Today’s level of unionization is lower than it was before the NLRA.57 In
2012, only 6.6% of the private-sector workforce was unionized,58 a decline that
43

Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron Deference Rule,
44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 739 (1992).
44 Estlund, supra note 42, at 1530.
45 Id. at 1540.
46 William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything
Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 272 (2002).
47 Recall that section 7 encourages “other concerted activities” for “other mutual aid or
protection,” which contemplates exercise of labor rights in non-union workplaces. See supra
text accompanying note 23; see also NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–15
(1962) (workers’ actions in walking out of a frigid factory shop were protected because even
though the workers were not members of a union their walkout grew out of a labor dispute).
48 Corbett, supra note 46, at 263.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 271.
52 Id. at 273–76.
53 Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 778.
54 Corbett, supra note 46, at 268.
55 See William B. Gould IV, The Third Way: Labor Policy Beyond the New Deal, 48 U.
KAN. L. REV. 751, 754 (2000).
56 Eugene Scalia, Ending Our Anti-Union Federal Employment Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 489, 493 (2001).
57 See Hirsch, supra note 36, at 155–56.
58 BLS 2012, supra note 22, at 1.
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began in the 1970s.59 Although the overall union membership rate is 11.3%, if
public-sector union density of 35.9% is factored in,60 the economic and management dynamics explored in this Note are more relevant to private-sector
unionization and affect far more workers, so the lower density statistic is most
salient. Union density is highest for older workers and lowest for younger
workers.61 States vary from the highest union density in New York (23.2%)
and the lowest in North Carolina (2.9%).62 Mirroring the declining membership
trends, the NLRB has seen fewer unfair labor practices complaints filed and has
imposed correspondingly fewer monetary awards and reinstatements to remedy
such violations, as well as less litigation for union representation and elections.63 With extremely low union density in some states and for the youngest
workers, and the statutory enforcement of collective action in similar decline,
the demise of unions altogether seems a distinct possibility.64
Scholars have articulated many reasons for the precipitous decline in
union density.65 The definitive answer is not necessary for this analysis, but a
list of factors is illustrative. Leading contributors are structural economic shifts
such as the movement away from a manufacturing to a service economy and
growth in the female workforce.66 Next, increasingly competitive markets due
to globalization and deregulation have constrained labor costs and made it more
difficult for higher wage union companies to prosper.67 The dynamic U.S.
economy also results in substantial “deaths and births” of firms; union firms die
59

Hirsch, supra note 36, at 156.
BLS 2012, supra note 22, at 1.
61 Density is 14.9% for workers aged 55–64 and 4.2% for those aged 16–24. Id. at 2.
62 Id. at 1. Other high-density states included Alaska (22.4%), Hawaii (21.6%), Washington
(18.5%), California (17.2%), and Michigan (16.6%); other low-density states included
Arkansas (3.2%), South Carolina (3.3%), Mississippi (4.3%) and Georgia (4.4%). Id. at 11.
63 See NLRB, GRAPHS & DATA: CHARGES AND COMPLAINTS, http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/graphs-data/charges-and-complaints/charges-and-complaints (last visited May 3,
2013) (2,247 complaints were issued in 2001, but that number fell to only 1,314 by 2012);
NLRB, GRAPHS & DATA: MONETARY REMEDIES, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/
graphs-data/remedies/monetary-remedies (last visited May 3, 2013) (NLRB issued monetary
remedies totaling $220.7 million in 2001, but by 2011 that number fell to only $60.4 million); NLRB, GRAPHS & DATA: REINSTATEMENT OFFERS, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/remedies/reinstatement-offers (last visited May 3, 2013) (4,225
reinstatement offers were extended in 2001, and in 2011, only 1,644 were offered); NLRB,
GRAPHS & DATA: APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS, 1974–2011, http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/graphs-data/litigations/appellate-court-decisions-1974-2011 (last visited May 3,
2013) (appellate courts issued 298 labor decisions in 1974, by 2001 that number had dropped
to 106, and in 2011 there were none).
64 Harold Meyerson, If Labor Dies, What’s Next?, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
prospect.org/article/if-labor-dies-whats-next (“In much of America unions have already
disappeared.”).
65 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 36, at 153; Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581 (2007); Henry S. Farber,
Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence Between the Public and Private
Sectors 1 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 503, 2005); see also
Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovski, The Future of Private Sector Unions in the
U.S., 22 J. LAB. RES. 229 (2001).
66 Hirsch, supra note 36, at 159; Lipset & Katchanovski, supra note 65, at 230.
67 Hirsch, supra note 36, at 161.
60
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at a disproportionate rate and “all new firms are born nonunion.”68 Institutional
factors include changing “worker sentiment for union representation, management opposition to unions, the interpretation and enforcement of labor law,”
and other workplace regulations that substitute for union representation.69
Unions themselves are dwindling, but there appears growing and unmet
demand for some form of worker representation and voice according to the
leading survey of workers.70 Freeman and Rogers’ Worker Representation and
Participation Survey found “a large gap between the kind and extent of representation and participation workers had and what they desired.”71 Subsequent
surveys indicated “a large increase in workers wanting to unionize,”72 and the
proportion of the public disapproving of unions dropped sharply from 1995
through 2005.73 The extent of unmet demand for union representation is
unclear, but appears suppressed by employer opposition to union organizing.74
A recent poll suggested a majority of workers would vote for a union in an
election.75 Freeman and Rogers’ latest estimate for the desired rate of privatesector unionization is fifty-eight percent.76
Finally, the lowest union density in a century is accompanied by growing
income inequality and there is clearly some correlation between the two phenomena. Technology and globalization are thought to be the major contributors
to growing income inequality,77 but the bargaining power of workers has also
been weakened by declining support for public education and labor unions.78 A
recent study suggests the decline of unionization explains from a fifth to as
much as a third of the growth in income inequality.79 Decline of unions could
be comparable in magnitude to the effect of rising education levels on the stratification of wages.80 The definitive work on wage inequality by Piketty and
Saez acknowledges that changes in unionization account for part of the increase
in income inequality.81 Certainly, the decline of unions featured prominently in
68

Farber, supra note 65, at 8.
Hirsch, supra note 36, at 163.
70 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 17–18 (updated ed.
2006) (Freeman and Rogers conducted their Worker Representation and Participation Survey
(WRPS) in 1994–1995. The authors analyzed dozens of subsequent polls and studies in their
revised 2006 edition).
71 Id. at 1.
72 Id. at 19.
73 Id. at 18.
74 Jack Fiorito & Paul Jarley, Union Organizing and Membership Growth: Why Don’t They
Organize?, 33 J. LAB. RES. 461, 482 (2012).
75 Richard Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever 6 (Econ. Pol’y Inst.,
Briefing Paper No. 182, 2007), available at http://www.sharedprosperity.org/bp182/bp182.
pdf.
76 See id.
77 Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 795.
78 Id. at 796.
79 Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality,
76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2011).
80 Id. at 528.
81 Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States 1913–1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 34 (2003). Interestingly, Piketty & Saez attribute the increase in the highest incomes to social norms accepting income inequality, which seems indirectly related to
union weakness.
69
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recent social justice protests about inequality of income and wealth. Unions
endorsed the “Occupy Wall Street” social movement in criticizing the great
wealth of the top one percent of Americans compared to the economic weakness of the bottom ninety-nine percent.82
Unions may have weakened, but it remains the official public policy of the
United States to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and protect workers’ freedom of association and self-organization.83 NLRA
rights are established constitutional rights, enforceable by the NLRB. Although
the individual employment rights regime offers a host of protections for
employees, current rock-bottom private-sector union density and diminished
exercise of collective labor rights correlate with growing income inequality.
This state of affairs calls for a new approach to the protection of workers’
rights. The academy has proposed various ways to revitalize U.S. labor law.
Scholars have called for retiring or overhauling the NLRA,84 reframing labor
rights as human rights,85 and using litigation practices to persuade courts to
hark back to the purpose of the Wagner Act.86 This is the context in which the
NLRB decided to take action to ensure private-sector employees were aware of
their rights.
II. HISTORY, PROMULGATION, AND CHALLENGE
NOTICE-POSTING RULE

OF THE

The notice-posting rule sought to inform employees of their statutory
rights under the NLRA.87 The full scope of protection under the Act has been
described as “one of the best-kept secrets of labor law.”88 There has never been
a blanket requirement for NLRA rights to be communicated to employees,89
making the NLRA “almost unique” among those agencies that administer
workplace law and routinely post notices of statutory rights.90 The NLRB
82

See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Standing Arm in Arm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011, at B1.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (Findings and Declarations of Policy).
84 See, e.g., Forum: At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be Retired?, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 221, 221–308 (2005) (collected papers addressing reform and repeal
options for the NLRA).
85 See, e.g., RUBEN J. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: HOW LEGAL FAULT LINES DIVIDE
WORKERS AND LEAVE THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION 24 (2012) (“[A] new way of approaching workers’ rights is necessary—one that views workers’ rights as fundamental human
rights.”).
86 See, e.g., DANNIN, supra note 6, at 41–43 (suggesting that to “take back the workers’
law,” NLRB cases must be litigated in a wholly new way, because few judges have studied
labor law; more fundamentally, cases need to refer to specific NLRA goals from section 1
and section 7, instead of the broader, easy goals of labor peace or interstate commerce).
87 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (Aug. 30, 2011)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
88 Corbett, supra note 46, at 267. DANNIN, supra note 6, at 52 (“NLRA values and policies
have too often been forgotten, their power untapped”).
89 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 & n.5.
(posting of rights has only been required in certain narrow circumstances such as three days
before representative elections, or as a penalty for NLRA violations).
90 Id. at 54,006–07 & n.6. It is common practice to post notices about workplace rights
under federal legislation. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10
(2012); the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2619(a) (2012); and the Fair
83
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determined that, for a variety of reasons, most employees were largely unaware
of their rights,91 stating: “[f]or employees to fully exercise their NLRA
rights . . . they [need to] know that those rights exist and that the Board protects
those rights.”92
A. History of the Rule and Employee Rights Awareness
Scholars have called for employee rights notice posting since Charles
Morris petitioned the NLRA for such a rule twenty years ago.93 After decades
of declining union density, employees seemed largely unaware of their labor
rights and “it appears that most are even unaware of the existence of the Board
and have no knowledge of what it is supposed to do. This is especially true of
unorganized employees . . . [who] are granted important and extensive rights
under section 7 of the Act.”94 Absence of a notice requirement under the
NLRA was “remarkable given the significance of the Act as the cornerstone of
private-sector labor law in this country.”95 Professor Dannin believes NLRA
values and policies are too often forgotten and untapped.96 “But these policies
are still the law, and the time has come to use and promote them if the NLRA is
to be effective.”97 Professor Corbett urges particular attention to section 7
rights: “If broadly interpreted and vigorously enforced, section 7 could obviate
the need for . . . additional individual rights statutes.”98
There are several explanations for the lack of awareness of NLRA rights.
First, with a low proportion of private-sector workplaces represented by unions,
the vast majority of workers lack a key source of information about labor
rights.99 At the peak of unionization, it was logical to assume that millions of
workers learned about their labor rights from their shop steward and that labor
rights knowledge spread from union households throughout communities.
Labor Standards Act, 29 C.F.R. § 516.4 (2012). Indeed, President Obama’s 2009 Executive
Order 13,496 requires federal contractors and subcontractors to post notices of NLRA rights.
Exec. Order No. 13,496, 29 C.F.R. pt. 471 (2010) (Notification of Employee Rights Under
Federal Labor Laws), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/EO13496.htm.
91 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006 (reasons for
low awareness of NLRA rights included: the low percentage of employees represented by
unions, the increasing proportion of immigrants, and young people unfamiliar with workplace rights).
92 Id.
93 Charles J. Morris, Renaissance at the NLRB—Opportunity and Prospect for Non-Legislative Procedural Reform at the Labor Board, 23 STETSON L. REV. 101, 111–14, 134 (1993).
Professor Morris petitioned the Board to develop a posting rule in 1993, and filed amicus
briefs in support of this rule in both district court cases. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v.
NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 785 (D.S.C. 2012); Brief of Charles J. Morris as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint’s Fifth Cause of Action, Nat’l Ass’n. of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-01629-ABJ).
94 Morris, supra note 93, at 111.
95 Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees of Their
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 433 (1995).
96 DANNIN, supra note 6, at 52.
97 Id.
98 Corbett, supra note 46, at 268.
99 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,014–15
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
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“Threat effects”100 furthered common understanding of labor rights: labor economics theory posits that the threat of unionization causes non-union workplaces to offer better wages and benefits, implying that even non-union
workplaces understood labor rights in times of greater union density.101
Second, today’s workplaces are populated with an increasing proportion of
immigrants and a new generation of young workers, neither group likely to be
familiar with U.S. worker rights.102 (Recall that the youngest workers are least
likely to be unionized.103) Former NLRB chairwoman Liebman commented
that “[m]ost people are surprised to learn that the Act’s basic protections . . . apply outside . . . unionized [workplaces].”104
Third, people in general have low levels of legal knowledge.105 Although
ignorance of the law is no excuse for most criminal and civil violations, the
NLRA is a remedial statute to protect constitutional rights of employees, and
knowledge of these rights is an essential precondition to exercising them.106
“[A] striking level of misunderstanding [has been identified among workers] of
the most basic legal rules governing the employment relationship.”107 In studies of worker perceptions of the rule of at-will employment, Professor Pauline
Kim found that “workers systematically overestimate their legal protections
against arbitrary and unjust discharge,”108 and were seriously mistaken about
their legal rights.109 Kim concluded that workers’ mistaken beliefs about the
law likely result from confusion between norms and law.110 In particular, workers’ strong beliefs about fair play led to persistent mistaken beliefs about the
law.111
It is unlikely that workers overestimate their NLRA rights. Given the low
rates of unionization, workers most likely underestimate their rights to any concerted activity or are completely ignorant that the law promotes and protects
labor rights. In recognition of the widespread ignorance of labor rights, the
NLRB launched a website in 2012 to communicate the rights of employees to
act together for their mutual aid and protection, even if they are not in a
100

HYCLAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 348.
Id.
102 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006.
103 See BLS 2012, supra note 22, at 2.
104 Liebman, supra note 35, at 4.
105 See generally Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 (discussing a variety of surveys documenting low levels of legal knowledge among the general population) [hereinafter Kim,
Norms]. See also Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and
Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 6–7 (2002) (“Whatever its source, the gap
between employer and employee beliefs and legal reality needs to be reckoned with.”).
106 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,006.
Although a six-month statute of limitations usually applies even in the NLRA context. Id. at
54,010.
107 Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions
of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133 (1997).
108 Id. at 155.
109 Kim, Norms, supra note 105, at 465.
110 Id. at 452.
111 Id.
101
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union.112 Announcing the website, which told the stories of more than a dozen
recent cases regarding protected concerted activity, NLRB Chairman Mark
Gaston Pearce noted that a right only had value if people knew it existed.113
We think the right to engage in protected concerted activity is one of the best kept
secrets of the National Labor Relations Act, and more important than ever in these
difficult economic times. Our hope is that other workers will see themselves in the
cases we’ve selected and understand that they do have strength in numbers.114

B. Promulgation of the Rule
To address the perceived gap in awareness of labor rights, in December
2010, the NLRB issued a proposed rule to require employers to post notices
informing employees of their NLRA rights.115 The notice, titled Employee
Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, states:
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) guarantees the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively with their employers, and to engage in other protected concerted activity or to refrain from engaging in any of the above activity.
Employees covered by the NLRA are protected from certain types of employer and
union misconduct. This Notice gives you general information about your rights, and
about the obligations of employers and unions under the NLRA. Contact the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal agency that investigates and resolves
complaints under the NLRA, using the contact information supplied below, if you
have any questions about specific rights that may apply in your particular
workplace.116

The notice goes on to outline the basic section 7 rights in clear, explanatory language, lists employer and union activities that are illegal, and provides
contact details and further sources of information.117 The notice must be at
least eleven inches by seventeen inches in size and posted in conspicuous locations where management typically posts employee notices.118
As the enforcement agency for the NLRA, the NLRB has statutory authority to prevent unfair labor practices. The new rule deemed failure or refusal to
post the notice to be an unfair labor practice or violation of section 8(a)(1),119
that is, to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title”120 (listed in Section I and highlighted in summary form in the notice above). The rule also stated that a failure
to post violation could be grounds for tolling the statute of limitations, and a
112 Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Launches Webpage Describing Protected Concerted
Activity (June 18, 2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-releases/
nlrb-launches-webpage-describing-protected-concerted-activity.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 75
Fed. Reg. 80,410 (Dec. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
116 Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, NLRB (Sept. 2011), https://
www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1562/employee_rights_fnl.pdf (emphasis
added).
117 See Appendix A.
118 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,027 (Aug.
30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
119 Id. at 54,031.
120 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
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knowing and willful failure to post the notice could be used as evidence of
unlawful motive in a related unfair labor practices case.121
The NLRB followed the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)122 to invite comments on its proposed rule and received responses
from 7,034 employers, employees, unions, employer organizations, and individuals.123 After considering comments received, the Board made some
changes124 and issued its final rule in August 2011 to take effect on November
14, 2011.125
While no study expressly addressed employee knowledge of NLRA
rights,126 dozens of comments challenging the necessity of the posting rule,
provided clear evidence of the lack of NLRA awareness.127 Individual workers
discussed personal experiences regarding lack of knowledge about the NLRA,
and such ignorance of labor rights was echoed by those who represent and
assist workers.128 Further, rule challengers’ frequently misunderstood the constitutionality of NLRA rights. And numerous comments openly opposed any
increase in employee knowledge of the NLRA.129 Indeed, the Board felt that
after reviewing the comments, the notice-posting rule “may have the beneficial
side effect of informing employers concerning the NLRA’s requirements.”130
Some comments opposed the rule precisely because they believed greater
awareness of NLRA rights would increase unionization and result in employees
filing more unfair labor practices complaints.131 The Board had a simple retort
to such comments: “[F]ear that employees may exercise their statutory rights is
not a valid reason for not informing them of their rights.”132
The vehemence of opposition to notifying employees of their labor rights
is a compelling reason in itself for the rule. Although many regard NLRA ideals as quintessentially American values,133 the rule challengers demonstrated
an obvious distaste for the NLRA. The National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, for example, announced that as a consequence of the rule: “Mom
121

Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,031.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
123 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,007.
124 Id. (the Board responded to the comments in detail in the final rule).
125 Id. at 54,006.
126 Id. at 54,018 n.96 (based on the comments received, the Board found it unnecessary to
conduct a study to determine the extent of employees’ knowledge of NLRA rights).
127 Id. at 54,015.
128 Id. at 54,015–16 (Comments included: “I had no idea that I had the right to join a union,
and was often told by my employer that I could not do so;” and “As an employee at-will, I
was not aware of my rights to form a union or any rights that I may have had under the
NLRA.”).
129 Id. at 54,016.
130 Id. at 54,017 (emphasis added) (Employer comments included: “Belonging to a union is
a privilege and a preference—not a right;” and “If my employees want to join a union they
need to look for a job in a union company.”).
131 Id. at 54,016.
132 Id.
133 See DANNIN, supra note 6, at 51 (NLRA values are “emphatically pro-democracy. Its
policies set out steps to give us workplaces consistent with a democracy and to empower
workers by giving them the skills needed to be citizens of a democracy.”) (citing Cynthia
Estlund, Reflections on the Declining Prestige of American Labor Law Scholarship, 23
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 789, 792 (2002)).
122
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and Pop shops . . . are now under the Obama Labor Board’s microscope and
will feel the pressure to hand over their employees to forced unionism . . . .”134
The National Association of Manufacturers expressed its commitment “to
fighting this rule in order to rein in the NLRB” and encouraged Congress to
“act soon to stop this rogue agency.”135
While the Board is meant to be impartial, it is often forgotten that the
Wagner Act was designed to favor labor.136 “When critics accuse the labor
laws and the NLRB of being pro-union . . . it is a sign that the Act is performing as intended and that the Board is following its mandate.”137 There is obvious irony in business and employer associations (collective groups themselves)
going to great lengths to prevent employees enjoying the benefits of
association:
Despite the image of U.S. residents as rugged individualists, most Americans
are group-oriented when they endeavor to advance their economic interests. . . . [Why are] those persons who most lack individual bargaining power and
who most need a collective voice to advance their interests . . . expected and even
encouraged to eschew organizational strength.138

With dwindling union density and low awareness of workplace law,
requiring employers to post notices informing workers of their labor rights
seems eminently reasonable—indeed, the courts have been unable to invalidate
the rule on reasonableness grounds, as we shall see.
C. Legal Challenges
In September 2011, the rule was challenged in the D.C. District Court by
the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the National Federation of
Independent Business, and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.139 Similar suit was brought in the South Carolina District Court by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce.140
The chief complaint was that the NLRB exceeded its statutory authority to
issue the rule because Congress failed to include a specific notice-posting
134 Riedel, Press Release, supra note 14, at 1 (quoting Mark Mix, President of National
Right to Work) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs, Press Release, supra note 14.
136 Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN. L. Rev. 1123, 1126 (1986).
137 Id.
138 Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest
Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1616, 1642–43 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS
AND THE LAW (1993)).
139 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2012). Consolidating
cases Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB (No. 1:11-cv-1629-ABJ) (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011) and
Nat’l Right to Work Found. Inc. v. NLRB (No. 1:11-cv-1683-ABJ) (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2011).
These actions were joined by Coal. for a Democratic Workplace v. NLRB (No. 1:11-cv2262) (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2011).
140 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778 (D.S.C. 2012). No doubt South
Carolina was hoped to be a hostile forum for the NLRB, given the anti-union feeling regarding the NLRB suit against Boeing for relocating their assembly line to the state in response
to union activity in the state of Washington. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops
Case Against Boeing After Union Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, at B3.
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requirement in the NLRA.141 Proposed enforcement penalties and tolling of the
statute of limitations for failure to comply with the rule were also challenged.142 Plaintiffs NAM et al. alternatively alleged that the rule was arbitrary
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act because it was promulgated without empirical support,143 and that the notice violated employers’
First Amendment right to speak or refrain from speaking.144
Facing litigation, the Board twice postponed implementation, initially until
January 2012 to allow further outreach and education, and later to April 2012 to
allow resolution of the district court cases.145 In March 2012, the rule was
upheld in part and invalidated in part by the D.C. District Court,146 however, in
April 2012, the South Carolina District Court held the Board lacked authority
to promulgate the entire rule.147 Once appeals were filed, the rule was subsequently enjoined by the D.C. Circuit,148 and the Board postponed the rule pending resolution in the circuit courts or the Supreme Court.149 As this journal
went to press, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule for invalid enforcement provisions,150 and the Fourth Circuit appellate decision was pending.151
D.C. District Court Judge Amy Berman Jackson held in March 2012 that
the NLRA granted the Board broad rulemaking authority to implement the provisions of the Act and this authority was not exceeded in the notice-posting
provision.152 However, Judge Jackson also held as invalid as a matter of law153
separate enforcement provisions deeming any failure to post the notice an
unfair labor practice154 and tolling the statute of limitations for non-compliance
with the rule.155 A month later, South Carolina District Court Judge David
Norton found the rule as a whole exceeded the Board’s authority in violation of
141

Complaint at 5–8, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012)
(No. 1:11-cv-01629-ABJ).
142 Id. at 6–8.
143 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 49; see also Chamber of Commerce, 856 F.
Supp. 2d at 784 (arguing that the rule violated the APA).
144 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 58; Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at
785 (arguing that the notice poster violates the First Amendment).
145 See Press Release, NLRB, Posting of Employee Rights Notice Now Required on Jan. 31
(Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter NLRB, Press Release], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/news-releases/posting-employee-rights-notice-now-required-jan-31-boardpostpones-deadl; see also Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Postpones Effective Date of Rights
Posting Rule to April 30 (Dec. 23, 2011), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/news/nlrbpostpones-effective-date-rights-posting-rule-april-30.
146 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
147 Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
148 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068, 2012 WL 4328371, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr.
17, 2012) (order granting temporary injunction).
149 Letter from Eric G. Moskowitz, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Special Litig., NLRB, to
Benjamin P. Glass Esq., Attorney, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Apr. 27, 2012) (noting that
declaratory judgments against the government are honored without need for injunction).
150 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068, 2013 WL 1876234, at *13 (D.C. Cir. May
7, 2013).
151 Id. at *3.
152 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
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the APA.156 Because statutory authority is an administrative law issue, analysis
relating to the Board’s authority to issue the rule is discussed below in Section
III. Here, the discussion briefly reviews the reasonableness of the rule, given
that both district courts agreed the rule was reasonable,157 and examines the
First Amendment issue, which failed in the D.C. District Court, was not
reached in South Carolina, but dominated the recent D.C. Circuit decision.158
1. District Courts Agreed the Rule Was Reasonable
Judge Jackson prefaced her opinion by noting the NLRA contained an
“unequivocal declaration of national policy” to encourage collective bargaining
and protect workers’ exercise of “full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.”159 At the outset, such preamble shows an attempt to adhere to the
core values of the NLRA. Judge Jackson affirmed NLRB rulemaking authority,
then proceeded to address the reasonableness of the notice posting rule, finding
not only that there was substantial evidence to justify the rule, but also that the
agency action demonstrated a “rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.”160 In contrast, Judge Norton’s opinion stressed the extraordinary nature of the rule by stating that after seventy-five years without requiring
notice posting, the NLRB changed course in 2010 with its proposed rule.161
Judge Norton’s analysis reached an administrative law finding of insufficient
authority for the notice-posting rule.162 But the South Carolina court had no
dispute with Judge Jackson’s verdict on reasonableness: Judge Norton said in a
footnote he would have agreed with Judge Jackson’s “fine opinion” on reasonableness had he proceeded beyond administrative authority analysis.163
At trial, the NLRB had no difficulty providing a reasonable explanation
for why its notice-posting rule was “ ‘necessary’ to carry out [NLRA policies]:
it concluded that in order for employees to fully exercise their NLRA rights”
they must “know that those rights exist.”164 Timely awareness of employee
rights was directly related to the Board’s ability to protect and enforce the
156

Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780, 797 (D.S.C. 2012).
In the D.D.C. Judge Jackson found the rule to be reasonable under Chevron Step Two
See discussion in Section III infra; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 49, and
declined to find the rule arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 52. In the S.C.D.C. Judge Norton
noted that if he had proceeded past Chevron Step One, he would have agreed with Judge
Jackson’s “fine opinion” on Chevron Step Two reasonableness. Chamber of Commerce, 856
F. Supp. 2d at 797 n.20.
158 The D.D.C. refused to overturn the notice-posting rule on First Amendment grounds,
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 61, and the D.S.C. deemed the issue moot. Chamber
of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 797 n.20. The D.C. Circuit felt the free speech issue
controlled much of the case. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068, 2013 WL
1876234, at *5 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2013).
159 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
160 Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 780.
162 Id. at 797 & n.20.
163 Id.
164 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
157
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rights, and posting notices would raise employee awareness.165 Judge Jackson
noted that the NLRB interpretation was so reasonable the plaintiffs had not
even proffered an argument that the rule was unreasonable.166
Surmounting the arbitrary and capricious standard on the question of
employees’ awareness of their rights was another easy task for the Board in the
D.C. District Court. Arbitrary and capricious review is highly deferential, and
an “agency may rely on [notice and comment]” submissions and “general analysis based on informed conjecture.”167 The Board’s determination that many
employees were unaware of their NLRA rights was based on studies, law
review articles, and comments submitted—and no counter-submission
debunked the Board’s findings.168 Similarly, Judge Jackson found notice posting to be a reasonable means of promoting greater knowledge among employees, given the benefits of a poster, the modest cost to employers, and the
content and manner of posting.169 Judge Jackson noted that the relative number
of people informed about their labor rights now and in the past was not particularly important.170 All that mattered to survive arbitrary and capricious analysis
was “whether it is reasonable to think that there are a significant number of
employees who are uninformed about their rights under the NLRA now and
whether it is reasonable to believe that the notice posting rule will decrease that
number.”171 Thus, there was little dispute the notice-posting rule was
reasonable.
2. The First Amendment and NLRA Section 8(c)
Challengers argued the notice-posting rule violated the First Amendment
because it compelled employers to speak.172 This seemingly ancillary argument
failed in the D.C. District Court and was moot in South Carolina.173 However,
the D.C. Circuit elevated employers’ right “not to speak” above all else.174 The
appellate panel was persuaded by plaintiff’s objection to “the message the gov165

Id.
Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 50.
169 Id. at 51.
170 Id. at 51 n.13.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 58.
173 See id. at 60; Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 797 n.20 (D.S.C.
2012). In seeking to enjoin the notice, NAM claimed violation of First Amendment rights
constituted irreparable harm. Denying the injunction, Judge Jackson noted that plaintiff’s
litigation strategy suggested their First Amendment argument was their weakest because it
received summary treatment in their pleadings, and was put aside entirely at the hearing.
Memorandum Opinion on parties’ cross-motion for summary judgment at 37–42, Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 11-1629, 2012 WL 1929889 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2012) (denying
injunction pending appeal).
174 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 12-5068, 2013 WL 1876234, at *5 (D.C. Cir. May 7,
2013). The panel did not decide whether NLRB had the regulatory authority to require notice
posting, choosing instead to invalidate the proposed enforcement mechanisms and conclude
that the Rule was not severable. However, the D.C. Circuit concurrence would have also
held the Board lacked authority for its “aggressively prophylactic” regulation because the
NLRA was “manifestly remedial.” Id. at *16.
166
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ernment has ordered them to publish . . . as one-sided, as favoring unionization.”175 Under this characterization, employers who refuse to post are
expressing their views about labor law, which merits section 8(c) protection,
that is, “express[ion] of any views . . . shall not . . . be evidence of an unfair
labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or promise of
benefit.”176 Challengers relied on Wooley v. Maynard for the right to refrain
from speaking.177 In Wooley, the Supreme Court found New Hampshire’s
requirement that vehicle license plates bear the motto “Live Free or Die” was
compelled speech because it interfered with plaintiff’s religious beliefs.178 The
D.C. Circuit thus concluded that both the First Amendment and section 8(c)
protect the right of employers (and unions) not to speak.179 But an ideological
slogan is a far cry from established labor law. Indeed, as Judge Jackson noted
in the district court, since the notice simply recites what the law says, “employers could not possibly have an alternative message” that the notice could
affect.180 Whereas the D.C. District Court regarded the NLRA poster as “government speech . . . not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause,”181
the circuit court drew no distinction between creation and dissemination of a
message.182 Even when disseminating the messages of others, “a ‘compelledspeech violation’ occurred when ‘the complaining speaker’s own message was
affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.’ ”183
The D.C. Circuit decision is far-reaching, and if not reversed by the
Supreme Court, could quickly render the NLRB irrelevant.184 In National
Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit qualified its earlier
dicta that “an employer’s right to silence is sharply constrained in the labor
context, and leaves it subject to a variety of burdens to post notices of rights
and risks.”185 Now, despite the fact that countless government mandated workplace notices withstand the First Amendment, any NLRB posting mandates are
in question because section 8(c) has been interpreted to protect employers and
create a zone of unregulated speech in every workplace. For good or ill, section
175

Id. at *8. Indeed, in oral argument, Judge Randolph stressed the poster was viewpoint
discriminatory. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 2013
WL 1876234 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2013) (No. 12-5068).
176 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
177 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all.”).
178 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (discussing Wooley).
179 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs, 2013 WL 1876234, at *9.
180 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 59–60.
181 Id. at 58 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
182 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 2013 WL 1876234, at *6 (citing Sorrel v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
183 Id. at *8 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 63 (2006)).
184 What is the future for NLRB prohibition of captive audience meetings within 24 hours
of an election, or mandated notice postings following adjudications of unfair labor practice?
185 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 2013 WL 1876234, at *9 (quoting UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training
Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(Judge Randolph noted the 8(c) right to silence was only against the Board’s finding an
unfair labor practice).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ311.txt

956

unknown

Seq: 20

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

17-JUN-13

10:37

[Vol. 13:937

8(c) has long been interpreted as a free speech right for employers.186 Now, a
mere notice-posting requirement is deemed too much of an imposition on
employer freedom to speak about unionization or remain silent about labor
rights. Yet, as Section V will explain, most employers are not shy about expressing their opinions about unionization. Somewhat disingenuously, the D.C. Circuit noted that no one “has even suggested that the posting rule was needed
because employers [were] misleading employees about their rights under the
[NLRA].”187 Respectfully, this Note submits that a great deal of misleading is
occurring in workplaces, and litigation to preserve ignorance about NLRA
rights is just the tip of the iceberg.
Following the trial court decisions in 2012, reasonableness of notice-posting was no longer in dispute, and the First Amendment issue also appeared to
be moot. Challengers’ appellate briefs focused on statutory authority and perceived congressional intent.188 Before moving to the question of rulemaking
authority, it is important to remember that this “unprecedented” rulemaking
seeks to promulgate a simple, reasonable workplace poster requirement.
III. NLRB RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
The notice-posting rule was only the second time in seventy-six years that
the NLRB promulgated a substantive rule.189 This departure from formulating
law and policy almost exclusively through adjudicating unfair labor practices
was historic and appeared to open a new avenue for labor law.190 Affirming
NLRB authority to require notice posting would revitalize labor law; rulemaking may be arduous, but the results would be more enduring for labor rights.
A. National Labor Policy and Rulemaking
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the NLRB “has the primary
responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy.”191 Thus, the
Board “necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices
of the broad statutory provisions.”192 The Court has also stated that Congress
186 DANNIN, supra note 6 at 109 (“[Section 8(c)] is commonly referred to as a free speech
right for employers, even though it does not mention employers . . . . It simply says that
certain sorts of speech cannot be a violation of the NLRA.”); see also Alan Story, Employer
Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 356, 394 (1995) (arguing that employer speech is really corporate commercial
speech and entitled to less First Amendment protection than political speech).
187 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs, 2013 WL 1876234, at *9 n.18.
188 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 29, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, Nos. 12-5068 &
12-5138, 2012 WL 3152145, at *29 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012); see also Brief for Thirty-one
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants
National Association of Manufacturers at 26, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v NLRB, No. 12-5068
(D.C. Cir. May 29, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for Thirty-one Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives].
189 The Board’s first rule established health care bargaining units in 1991. See Notification
of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug. 30, 2011) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
190 Rubenstein, supra note 8.
191 NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).
192 Id. (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978)).
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met the difficulties of applying the “broadly phrased” NLRA by “leaving the
adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration . . . subject
to limited judicial review.”193 The Court has also recognized the many advantages of rulemaking: issuing a proposed rule, soliciting and considering public
comments, and then issuing a final rule, provides the Board “a forum for soliciting the informed views of those affected in industry and labor before embarking on a new course.”194
Key differences between rulemaking and adjudication animate any new
rule of law. Rulemaking can be distinguished from adjudication largely on the
basis of whom the rule affects: adjudications affect specific persons, while
rulemaking affects a class of persons.195 Further, adjudication produces an
order, whereas rulemaking is a legislative process.196 Because of general applicability, procedural due process does not apply to rulemaking.197 Naturally,
controversies over fairness take place in advance of the application of a rule, so
the prospective, legislative nature of rulemaking in the fraught realm of labor
relations is a lightning rod for contention. Leading labor scholar Cynthia
Estlund has testified on Capitol Hill that rulemaking offers greater policy stability than adjudicatory precedents, but more permanent rules are earned
through a time-consuming process.198 With adjudications routinely reversed by
an incoming Board of opposing political persuasion,199 it is not surprising that
labor rulemaking is deeply controversial.
The Board has traditionally interpreted the NLRA exclusively through
adjudications of individual cases.200 This is atypical for a federal agency.201
Indeed, in 1978, when he was a professor of administrative law, future Justice
Antonin Scalia described the “flight . . . from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to generalized disposition through rulemaking” as “perhaps the most
notable development in federal government administration during the past two
decades.”202 Clearly the NLRB missed the revolution, although not for want of
193 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). The Court noted that “Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems” to circumvent the Act’s policies,
nor define the “whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of
specific situations.” Id.
194 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294–95 (1974) (“the choice between
rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s discretion.”).
195 MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 62
(3d ed. 2009).
196 Id. at 192.
197 Id. at 192–93.
198 See Hearing, supra note 9, at 3.
199 Harold J. Datz, When One Board Reverses Another: A Chief Counsel’s Perspective, 1
AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 67, 68–69 (2011) (noting the increased practice of a Democratic
Board reversing important precedents of a Republican Board and vice versa).
200 Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J.
982, 982 (1980) [hereinafter Note, NLRB Rulemaking].
201 Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 872 (2011). See also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 167 (3d ed. 1991). In fact, a current labor law
casebook features neither a chapter nor even an index entry on rulemaking; DAU-SCHMIDT ET
AL., supra note 40, at xxiii–xxxiv, 1052, 1056 (2009).
202 ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 195, at 192 (quoting Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee:
The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 376) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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trying: the failed Labor Reform Act of 1977, which provided for extensive
NLRB rulemaking, passed in the House before failing in the Senate.203 For
several decades, a chorus of scholars and courts, regardless of ideological leanings, has encouraged the Board to act through rulemaking204 because the Board
unquestionably has the authority to do so, and rulemaking offers many benefits.205 Policymaking through rulemaking would also be viewed by many as “a
victory for transparency and administrative regularity in Board
decisionmaking.”206
Rulemaking can be arduous, however. The Board proposed its first substantive rule in 1987 to define the scope of health care bargaining units.207 The
American Hospital Association challenged that rule in 1989, and it was not
upheld until 1991, almost four years after the rulemaking process began.208 The
Board proposed two other substantive rules in the 1990s but withdrew them due
to political pressure.209 Progress of the notice-posting rule has been as glacial
and contentious as the Board’s prior attempts at rulemaking. The rule was proposed in December 2010 and published in August 2011 as a 144-page Final
Rule after the Board considered over 7,000 comments submitted during the
notice and comment period (from Dec. 2010 to Feb 2011).210 The rule was
twice delayed to respond to legal challenges before it was finally enjoined
pending appeal.211 A more recent attempt at rulemaking did not fare any better.
The Board in 2012 also suspended a 2011 rule to amend election procedures,
which drew more than 65,000 comments and a legal challenge.212
203

Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 200, at 987 & n.29, n.30 & n.31.
See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 170 & n.29 (1985); Fisk & Malamud, supra note 11, at
2015–16; Grunewald, supra note 15, at 274–75; Peck, supra note 15, at 260.
205 See Peck, supra note 15, at 260–61; see also Hearing, supra note 9, at 2–3 (outlining
the benefits of rulemaking).
206 Hearing, supra note 9, at 3.
207 MEL HAAS ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE “OBAMA” NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD: THE POTENTIAL USE OF RULEMAKING TO ENHANCE UNION ORGANIZING
6 (2010).
208 Id. at 6–7; see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1991).
209 HAAS ET AL., supra note 207, at 7.
210 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006 (proposed Dec.
21, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104); see also Final Rule for Notification of
Employee Rights, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/final-rule-notification-employee-rights (last visited May 4, 2013) (noting that the Board received over 7,000
comments about the proposed rule).
211 See Employee Rights Poster Requirement Delayed—Again, AM. HOTEL & LODGING
ASS’N, http://www.ahla.com/content.aspx?id=34072 (last visited May 4, 2013); see also
NLRB, Press Release, supra note 145; NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce on Recent
Decisions Regarding Employee Rights Posting, NLRB (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.nlrb.
gov/news-outreach/news-releases/nlrb-chairman-mark-gaston-pearce-recent-decisionsregarding-employee-rig (announcing that the D.C. Circuit Court of appeals “temporarily
enjoined the NLRB’s rule”); Fact Sheets, Employee Rights Notice Posting, NLRB, www.
nlrb.gov/poster (last visited May 4, 2013) (noting the D.C. Circuit Court enjoining the rule).
212 Press Release, NLRB, NLRB Suspends Implementation of Representation Case Amendments Based on Court Ruling (May 15, 2012) (announcing the Board’s temporary suspension of the new rule), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-releases/nlrbsuspends-implementation-representation-case-amendments-based-court-; see also Press
Release, NLRB, Board Adopts Amendments to Election Case Procedures (Dec. 21, 2011),
204
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The protracted nature of agency rulemaking has been likened to the
decades-long development of bone tissue. Scholars describe this as the “ossification” of rulemaking.213 Although still an effective tool to elicit public participation in agency policy, “the rulemaking process has become increasingly rigid
and burdensome . . . and evolving judicial doctrines have obliged agencies to
take greater pains to ensure the technical bases for rules are capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.”214 But traditional adjudication is not necessarily
speedy or efficient, and NLRB opponents themselves acknowledge that
because the courts generally defer to agency rules, the Board could “[w]ith
little effort” write a “logical, reasoned argument [to support promulgating] a
pro-union substantive rule of law.”215
Had the Board established a track record of rulemaking, perhaps there
would be less of a brouhaha over the notice-posting rule. “The NLRB has the
power to engage in rulemaking, and has even done so (exactly once) with considerable success, if success can be measured by the Supreme Court’s satisfaction with the process.”216 The Board’s first successful rulemaking, in 1987,217
was unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court in American Hospital Association v. NLRB.218 The Court found a general grant of rulemaking authority in
section 6219 “unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at issue in this case
unless limited by some other provision in the Act.”220 Broad rulemaking powers have been granted to many other federal administrative bodies using similar
language to NLRA section 6.221 Although the Board has at times engaged in
quasi-rulemaking through adjudication,222 it conducted such rulemaking without the benefits and protections offered by compliance with the APA and was
therefore susceptible to judicial disapproval.223 An NLRB rulemaking would
be presumed valid under APA procedures if the Board conducted extensive
notice and comment, carefully analyzed comments received, and justified the
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-releases/board-adopts-amendmentselection-case-procedures (noting that over “65,000 comments were submitted” related to the
proposed rule).
213 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60 (1995). See also Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002).
214 McGarity, supra note 213, at 1385.
215 HAAS ET AL., supra note 207, at 7.
216 Fisk & Malamud, supra note 11, at 2017.
217 HAAS ET AL., supra note 207, at 6; see Grunewald, supra note 15, at 275–76.
218 Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 608 & 620 (1991).
219 See discussion infra Section III.B.1.
220 Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 609–10.
221 See, e.g., Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 277, 280–81 (1969) (where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may “make . . . such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,’ ” the Court has held
that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is
“reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.”); see also infra Section
III.B.1.
222 See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764–65 (1969); NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974).
223 Peck, supra note 15, at 271–72.
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rule based on a reasoned analysis of an extensive record.224 NLRB rulemaking
is all very well in theory, but APA procedure was not the chief concern in this
instance, as the following discussion will explain.
B. Authority for Notice Posting
The Board’s statutory authority to promulgate the notice-posting rule was
the crux of the instant controversy. Recall that the D.C. District Court held that
the NLRB did not exceed its statutory authority to require employers to post
the notice (though it invalidated two enforcement provisions),225 but the South
Carolina District Court held the Board did exceed its authority.226 On appeal in
the D.C. and Fourth circuits, parties, and amici argued various interpretations
of the Board’s statutory authority. Rather than rehash the appellate briefs, this
section examines two central, intertwined issues: the validity of the posting rule
under the NLRA section 6 rulemaking provision and the appropriateness of
judicial deference to NLRB statutory interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.
1. NLRA Section 6 Rulemaking Authority
Because the NLRA lacks an express notice-posting provision, an alternative source of authority is required for the posting rule. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) each asserted
that the posting rule exceeded NLRB authority because Congress omitted any
notice-posting requirement in the NLRA.227 NAM argued the Board only had
authority to establish rules for elections and the adjudication of unfair labor
practice charges, not the authority to promulgate general rules for the workplace.228 It is true that the NLRA lacks a notice-posting provision, but it does
provide the Board authority to make rules and regulations necessary to effectuate any of the provisions of the NLRA.229
Section 6 of the NLRA . . . provides that “the Board shall have authority from
time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559], such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.”230

With general rulemaking authority assured, the question becomes whether a
rule is necessary to carry out provisions of the NLRA. Here the district courts
diverged.
224 Grunewald, supra note 15, at 278 & n.16; see also NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29
U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (granting the Board authority to enforce its enacting statute following
the procedures set out in the APA); Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 763–64 (outlining APA
requirements for proper rulemaking, “[t]he [APA] requires, among other things, publication
in the Federal Register of notice of proposed rulemaking and of hearing; opportunity to be
heard; a statement in the rule of its basis and purposes; and publication in the Federal Register of the rule as adopted.” (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553)).
225 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2012).
226 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780 (D.S.C. 2012).
227 Id. at 789–90; Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
228 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
229 29 U.S.C. § 156.
230 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,008 (Aug.
30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
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The lack of a notice-posting provision was not dispositive for the D.C.
District Court. Judge Jackson said the rule challengers “read too much into
Congress’s silence” regarding the omission of a notice-posting requirement in
the NLRA.231 The court found the stated purpose of the rule directly related to
NLRA policy in section 1 and the language of section 7, each of which were
“provisions of the Act” under section 6.232 NLRB dissemination of information
about employee rights was “well within its bailiwick,” unlike the Federal Trade
Commission’s failed attempt to regulate the legal profession in American Bar
Association v. FTC.233 Further, American Hospital Association affirmed that
the section 6 rulemaking authority was “unquestionably sufficient” unless limited by some other provision in the NLRA.234 “Plaintiffs complain loudly about
the lack of Board authority here, but they fail to point to any limiting
provision.”235
The South Carolina District Court acknowledged the wide discretion to
enact rules granted by section 6, but failed to find notice posting necessary to
carry out provisions of the Act.236 Judge Norton adopted a strict definition of
necessary, guided by statutory structure rather than plain language.237 In Judge
Norton’s view, the NLRB confused a necessary rule with one that was simply
useful.238 Even if the rule aided or furthered the aspirational goals of section 1
by notifying employees of their section 7 rights, the rule was not necessary to
carry out any other provisions because the NLRA did not place an affirmative
obligation on employers to post notices of employee rights.239 The court interpreted American Hospital to only authorize a rule tailored to an NLRA provision, in that case making section 9(b) bargaining unit determinations.240 Under
such an interpretation of rulemaking authority, the notice-posting rule could not
be “necessary” to carry out a nonexistent notice provision.
The South Carolina approach is more than a pedantic definition of necessary. According to Professor Morris, the original proponent of notice posting,241 Judge Norton’s extreme test for agency rulemaking would effectively
repeal section 6 by judicial fiat.242 This selective approach to qualifying provisions of the NLRA seems to lean heavily on NLRB publicity materials. Judge
Norton quoted a “Basic Guide” to the NLRA as proving Congress intended the
Board to have “two main functions: to conduct representation elections and
231

Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
Id. at 45, 49.
233 Id. at 44–45. NAM urged the court to follow American Bar Association v. FTC, 430
F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which refused to accord deference to the FTCs interpretation of a
new financial regulation. Id. at 44.
234 Id. at 45.
235 Id.
236 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789–90 (D.S.C. 2012).
237 Id. at 789.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 788–89.
241 Professor Morris initiated the notice-posting rule with a rulemaking petition in 1993, and
filed amicus briefs in both district court cases. Charles J. Morris, Are Employers Afraid of
Employees Learning of their NLRA Rights?, CHARLES J. MORRIS ON LAB. REL. (Apr. 18,
2012), http://charlesjmorris.blogspot.com/2012/04/are-employers-afraid-of-employers.html.
242 See id.
232
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certify the results, and to prevent employers and unions from engaging in unfair
labor practices.”243 Further, NLRB annual reports and memoranda acknowledged that it does not initiate cases, that it lacks “roving investigatory powers,”
and that its proceedings are invoked only by an unfair labor practice charge or
representative petition.244 On this basis, Judge Norton interpreted the NLRB to
be a “reactive” agency whose authority must be triggered by an outside party,
and therefore the notice-posting rule could not be necessary under section 6
because it proactively dictated employer conduct prior to any petition or
charge.245
The South Carolina District Court’s restrictive interpretation of NLRB
rulemaking authority is unprecedented. Professor Morris found Judge Norton’s
opinion incredible in terms of settled law.246 In its appeal, the NLRB argued
the district court’s reading of the term necessary was at odds with the Supreme
Court’s generous construction of the Constitution’s “necessary and proper”
clause.247 NLRB stated that labor caselaw regards the term “necessary” as
ambiguous, primarily entrusted to agency expertise, and typically construed as
“ ‘reasonably related’ to the purposes and policies of the statute.”248 Judge
Norton’s view of necessary regulation is at odds with most of administrative
law. This Note predicts that such a contorted definition of necessity will not
survive appellate review.249
On appeal, the Chamber of Commerce predictably reiterated the South
Carolina court’s holding that the “structure of the [NLRA] . . . places the Board
in a reactive role in relation to employers covered by the Act.”250 Such a role
only authorized the Board to “dictate” employers’ conduct after an unfair labor
practice charge or a petition for representation is filed.251 Legislative history
was parsed to argue that “Congress intended a reactive role for the Board,”252
and express notice provisions in other workplace statutes were presented as
evidence that Congress did not intend for any NLRA notice posting.253 Relying
on Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. FDA,254 the Chamber of Commerce
acknowledged that the Board’s justification for the rule may be “laudable,” but
no matter “how serious the problem,” NLRB could not “exercise its authority
243

Chamber of Commerce, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
Id.
245 Id. at 790–91 & n.11.
246 Morris, supra note 241.
247 Brief of Appellant at 17–18, NLRB v. Chamber of Commerce, No. 12-1757 (4th Cir.
Sept. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Brief, NLRB].
248 Id. at 17.
249 Moreover, this extremely limited view of NLRB jurisdiction is a predictable product of
unfavorable forum for labor in the Carolinas. See supra note 140. This should be mitigated
in the Fourth Circuit.
250 Corrected Brief of Appellees at 22, Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, No. 12-1757 (4th
Cir. Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Brief, Chamber of Commerce] (internal quotation marks
omitted).
251 Id. at 21.
252 Id. at 24.
253 Id. at 27–29.
254 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131, 161 (2000) (holding
that the FDA did not have jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products).
244
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in a manner inconsistent with the administrative structure” enacted by
Congress.255
If the Board’s rulemaking function is to be tightly proscribed to a few
reactive provisions, the logical outcome will be a withering of NLRB functionality. Rather than follow Judge Norton’s highly selective approach to the
NLRA provisions, it is logical that all nineteen sections of this Act are recognized as provisions for the purpose of any rulemaking, from the broad policies
of section 1 to the most specific and technical latter provisions. A rule supported by an extensive record should be deemed “necessary” under the ordinary
standard that it is reasonably related to the purposes and policies of the statute.
Here, the posting rule is both reasonably related and necessary to carry out
sections 1, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Act, because the effectiveness of all these
provisions depends on employees knowing their rights and how to enforce
them.256 To exercise rights to concerted activity or to join a union, file representative petitions, and charge unfair labor practices, the Act “presupposes
employee awareness of and participation in the Board’s processes.”257 The
necessity of employee awareness of NLRA rights is not “circular logic”258 but
common sense.
2. Deference to the NLRB Under the Chevron Doctrine
Under the well-known test articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,259 courts will defer to a reasonable interpretation of a gap left by Congress in the statutes they administer.260
Chevron deference was accorded to the Board’s notice-posting rule by the D.C.
District Court, but denied in the South Carolina court. Application of the Chevron doctrine will thus be a decisive factor on appeal. This section evaluates the
parties’ Chevron arguments in light of two administrative law themes: first,
appropriateness of Chevron deference for the NLRB, and second, overuse of
the “One Congress” fiction in statutory interpretation. This Note argues that the
notice-posting rule was an ideal candidate for Chevron deference, which should
be confirmed at the appellate level.
After extensive analysis established the “manifest necessity” of the noticeposting requirement, the NLRB concluded the rule filled a Chevron gap in the
NLRA statutory scheme.261 Here, the statutory gap arises in part because of
declining union density when “unions have been a traditional source of information about the NLRA’s provisions.”262 The “administrative machinery” of
the NLRA depends on employers and employees having knowledge of their
rights in order to privately initiate proceedings, however the statute “has no
255

Brief, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 250, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,010 (Aug.
30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
257 Brief, NLRB, supra note 247, at 12.
258 Contra Brief, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 250, at 22.
259 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
260 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786 (D.S.C. 2012).
261 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54,011.
262 Id.
256
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provision [for] making that knowledge available.”263 The Board relied on its
ability to “adapt the Act,” in light of recent realities, to the “changing patterns
of industrial life,” and “the Board’s cumulative experience”264 as urged in
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.265
The Chevron two-step test presents the reviewing court with two
questions:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, . . . Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question . . . the question [under step two] is whether the agency’s answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.266

The NLRB acknowledged that Congress did not speak directly to the
Board’s authority to promulgate a notice-posting rule, and argued it reasonably
interpreted section 6 to authorize the rulemaking.267 In the D.C. District Court,
Judge Jackson could not find that “Congress unambiguously intended to preclude the Board from promulgating” a notice-posting rule.268 Neither the statutory text nor any binding precedent supported such narrowing of rulemaking
authority.269 Prior cases only constrained the Board’s adjudicative functions,
and did not consider the scope of its general rulemaking authority under section
6.270
The South Carolina District Court took a different tack, framing the issue
as whether Congress intended to delegate such authority, instead of whether
Congress evidenced a clear intent to withhold jurisdiction.271 The delegation
approach was crafted in Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. FDA.272 Because the
NLRA was “silent”273 as to notice posting, the South Carolina court determined that searching analysis was necessary to “ascertain congressional intent”
which required looking at “the overall statutory scheme, legislative history, the
history of evolving congressional regulation in the area, and a consideration of
263

Id.
Id.
265 NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (“The responsibility to adapt the
Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board. . . . It is the province of
the Board, not the courts, to determine whether or not the ‘need’ [for a Board rule] exists in
light of changing industrial practices and the Board’s cumulative experience in dealing with
labor-management relations. For the board has the ‘special function of applying the general
provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,’ . . . and its special competence in
this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination.”).
266 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(emphasis added).
267 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 43 (D.D.C. 2012).
268 Id. at 48.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 47.
271 Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 856 F. Supp. 2d 778, 786–87 (D.S.C. 2012).
272 Id. (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.
1998), aff’d, 529 U.S. 120 (2000)). Williamson was affirmed by the Supreme Court; the
district court likely emphasized the Fourth Circuit analysis in Williamson to withstand
review in that circuit.
273 Id. at 792.
264
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other relevant statutes.”274 Judge Norton did not find authority delegated to the
Board to regulate employers in the manner proposed (by requiring notice posting). “The Board cannot simply hang its hat on Congress’s silence, especially
when the authority asserted here conflicts with the Board’s historic ‘quasi-judicial’ role in relation to employers . . . .”275 The court rejected the idea of giving
the NLRB “unbridled rulemaking discretion”276 and warned against deference
to agencies “ ‘slip[ping] into a judicial inertia,’ resulting in the ‘unauthorized
assumption by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by
Congress.’ ”277
The notice-posting rule’s failure to surmount Chevron step one in the
South Carolina decision raises the question: How much deference should be
given to agency interpretations of their enabling statutes? Under step one of
Chevron, the Government is meant to have “a built-in advantage in a dispute”278: “[T]he agency does not have to demonstrate that the statute actually
endorses its position—only that that statute does not rule it out.”279 Chevron
should allocate crucial policy decisions to a politically responsive branch of
government.280 The more politically responsive an agency, especially one
charged with overseeing administration of a statute day-to-day, the more defensible is judicial deference to the agency.281 The NLRB is particularly deserving
of Chevron deference because the NLRA is a “broadly drafted, frequently
ambiguous statute address[ing] fundamental policy concerns.”282 Congress
determined that concerted activities deserve protection, “but the parameters of
that protection are strikingly amorphous.”283 Given that “Congress created the
NLRB to [enforce] the NLRA against a backdrop of hostility toward judiciallycreated labor [law], . . . the Chevron ‘fiction’ ” preferring the agency “resolve
statutory ambiguities appears [to be] grounded in fact.”284 The South Carolina
District Court erred by misusing Chevron and overemphasizing the NLRA
silence on a notice requirement.
In its appellate argument, the Chamber of Commerce relied heavily upon
Williamson Tobacco. This argument regards context as “crucial” and requires
274

Id. at 787 (quoting Williamson, 153 F.3d at 162) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 791.
276 Id. at 791–92.
277 Id. at 792 (quoting Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)). Judge
Norton’s obvious disdain for NLRB discretion shines through the penultimate footnote of his
decision: “Perhaps the Board should have heeded the admonition of Simon and Garfunkel:
‘And no one dared / disturb the sound of silence.’ ” Id. at 797 n.19.
278 ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 195, at 536.
279 Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86 (1999)).
280 Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis “Exception” to the Chevron Deference Rule,
44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 735 (1992). Professor White is current Dean of the University of
Georgia Law School. See Rebecca H. White, UNIV. OF GA. LAW, http://www.law.uga.edu/
profile/rebecca-h-white/ (last visited May 4, 2013).
281 White, supra note 280, at 737.
282 Id. at 738.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 739; see also Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 192 (2009)
(noting a succession of Supreme Court decisions, before and after Chevron, that uphold
Board statutory constructions).
275
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that a court not only interpret a statute as a “symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,” but that it also “look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy.”285 It should be remembered that Williamson was a controversial 5–4 decision denying FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products on the
basis of a legislative analysis that “roamed widely.”286 In response to this judicial narrowing of agency authority, Congress subsequently gave jurisdiction to
the FDA to regulate tobacco.287
In seeking to withhold rulemaking power from the NLRB, the Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers make liberal use of
the “one-Congress fiction,” particularly when they draw heavily upon a case
like Williamson Tobacco.288 The folly of the “one-Congress” approach ignores
the reality of the “inevitably shifting legal and political terrain” that comes with
different Congresses and instead attempts to “justify a particular interpretation
of a disputed statutory provision by [referring] to other statutes’ identical, similar, or different provisions.”289 Faced with the Herculean task of making sense
of the law as a whole, the one-Congress interpretive practice frees judges to
make “unpredictable and unprincipled ends-oriented interpretation” which
threatens to become a “random and roving ‘clear statement’ doctrine.”290 Judge
Harold Leventhal noted that when judges resort to legislator-created legislative
history they often manipulate the process in a way that is similar to “looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends.”291
Here, the challengers and Judge Norton left no stone unturned to try to
prove that Congress never intended for the NLRB to require workplace notice
posting. Two vivid examples of the one-Congress approach in this controversy
are the multiple references to the legislative history of the NLRA and the inclusion of notice-posting requirements in numerous other statutes. The Chamber
of Commerce appellate brief notes that in seventy-six years, “Congress has
regularly included notice-posting provisions in nine other labor or employment
statutes . . . but never gave such authority to the NLRB.”292 The one-Congress
fiction is particularly inapt given not only that labor relations are widely
acknowledged as “one of the most polarized and controversial subjects of
national political debate,” but also that successive Congresses have enacted
only two major labor relations reforms since 1935.293
285

Brief, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 250, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 171, 195 (2000).
287 See Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776, 1776 (June 22, 2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)).
288 See Buzbee, supra note 286, at 194 (discussing the idea of a one-Congress fiction as it
related to the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. decision) (“[T]he Brown & Williamson
majority opinion contains an essential strain of logic that looks at Congress as a unitary,
unchanging principal . . . .”).
289 Id. at 173.
290 Id. at 176–77.
291 Id. at 231 (citing Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 846 (1992)).
292 Brief, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 250, at 28.
293 See Note, NLRB Rulemaking, supra note 200, at 988 (citing to Congressional hearings
urging the NLRB to engage in greater rulemaking).
286
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It was error for the South Carolina District Court to rely primarily upon
silence in the NLRA to prohibit the notice-posting rule. Silence cannot be evidence that Congress considered the matter because there are too many other
plausible explanations for legislative silence.294 Moreover, “[t]here is nothing
whatsoever in the NLRA itself or its legislative history on the specific subject
of this Rule.”295 The Board argued that explaining congressional non-action
when Congress itself sheds no light is to “venture into speculative unrealities.”296 Given the tensions inherent in labor policy, the NLRB is particularly
deserving of Chevron deference for its expert interpretation of the NLRA. And
broad statutory rulemaking authority coupled with a comprehensive factual
record should speak louder than random and heavily partisan interpretations of
historic legislative intent that occur under the “one-Congress fiction.”
C. Failure to Post the Notice
To enforce notice posting, the NLRB wanted to designate an employer’s
failure to post the notice as an unfair labor practice.297 In addition, the Board
wished to deem willful failure to post the notice as evidence of unlawful motive
in any unfair labor practice case and toll the statute of limitations for filing
unfair labor practice charges where employers have failed to post.298 In declaring that the entire rule lacked authority, the South Carolina court did not single
out the enforcement provisions for analysis. However, the D.C. District Court
found the Board exceeded its authority with provisions to deem failure to post
an unfair labor practice and toll the statute of limitations.299 In contrast, the
unlawful-motive evidentiary provision was validated by the district court,
because the question of whether there had been a knowing and willful refusal to
post the notice would be determined on a case-by-case basis should the facts
and circumstances show interference300 and was neither a blanket finding nor
presumption of anti-union animus.301 Judge Jackson acknowledged the Board
was seeking to provide some teeth to enforce the notice-posting provision, and
she noted that “severing” enforcement provisions from the main rule would not
completely deprive the Board of its desired bite302 because the Board could still
use failure to post as evidence for an unfair labor practice charge and equitable
tolling would still be available where justified.303
Deeming failure to post an unfair labor practice exceeded the Board’s
authority because Congress had specifically defined and limited the conduct
that could constitute an unfair labor practice in sections 8 and 10 of the NLRA
and so the enforcement provision was “limited by some other provision of the
294

Brief, NLRB, supra note 247, at 31.
Id. at 33.
296 Id. at 34.
297 Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,031 (Aug.
30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
298 Id.
299 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 55 (D.D.C. 2012).
300 Id. at 54–55.
301 Id. at 63 n.26.
302 Id. at 62.
303 Id.
295
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Act” and could not survive the Chevron analysis.304 Although the Board had
contended that failure to post the notice qualified as an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(1) “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of . . . rights,”305 the D.C. District Court rejected the argument because
interference was “getting in the way” of employees’ exercise of their rights, not
a mere failure to facilitate exercise of the rights.306 Similarly, the Board was
not authorized to toll the statute of limitations because Congress did not leave
such a gap to be filled but instead plainly mandated a short six-month period
for filing an unfair labor practice charge.307
The enforcement provisions hang in the same limbo as the posting rule
itself, so the reviewing courts must consider which provisions are supported by
regulatory authority in order to effectuate the posting requirement.308 Both tolling and deeming failure-to-post an unfair labor practice appear to exceed
NLRB authority because they fall under other limiting provisions of the
NLRA.309 In contrast, there is no provision to limit authority for the Board to
find knowing and willful failure to post as evidence of unlawful “anti-union
animus.”310 At least one enforcement provision should be upheld, or hostile
employers will thwart with impunity not only the implementation of the noticeposting rule but ultimately the NLRA.
The actions of the NLRB are inevitably viewed through a partisan lens and
the rulemaking process brings all the controversy to the fore. The notice-posting rule was only a modest step to communicate NLRA rights and was based
on an extensive factual and administrative record. Other rules are likely to be
more contentious. For instance, the subsequent election-amendments rule to
streamline election procedures attracted ten times the feedback of the noticeposting rule.311 It had been so long since election procedures had been updated
that they still required carbon copies and lacked any form of electronic filing or
communications.312 Issues of far greater import await NLRB attention following these initial forays into rulemaking. It is essential to the effectiveness of
modern labor law that the Board has some assurance of its general rulemaking
authority going forward.

304

Id. at 52–53.
Id. at 52.
306 Id. at 54.
307 Id. at 56.
308 As discussed in section II, at the time of publication, the D.C. Circuit had just vacated
the rule by invalidating all three enforcement provisions, and the Fourth Circuit decision was
still pending.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 234–35 for the discussion on limiting provisions.
310 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 846 F. Supp. 2d at 63 n.26 (Judge Jackson noted that unlawful
animus provision neither created an unfair presumption nor relieved the Board of making a
case-by-case determination of knowing and willful failure to post).
311 See supra note 212.
312 Ellin Dannin, Public Commentary: Why the Amendments to the NLRB’s Proposed Election Regulations Should Be Approved, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/approving_amendments_to_the_nlrbs_election_regulations.
305
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ECONOMICS

A thorough economic analysis of the notice-posting controversy is beyond
the scope of this Note, but several insights from economic theory are germane.
There are macroeconomic elements in the rationale of the NLRA, classic
microeconomic forces influencing firm and union behavior, competing economic theories of unionism, and idiosyncrasies of information and other imperfections in labor markets. In the spirit of Louis Brandeis,313 these theories are
explored to go beyond pure legal analysis and provide broader context for the
rule.
A. The NLRA and Macroeconomics
The preamble to the NLRA describes macroeconomic and industrial conditions not dissimilar to those existing in the American economy during promulgation of the notice rule. Widespread current business and employer
opposition to unionization paralleled the original NLRA recognition of “denial
by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining . . . .”314
Although strikes are rare today (because judicial interpretation has narrowed
the scope of protection under the Act315) and commerce continues to flow,
there has clearly been “diminution of employment and wages in such volume as
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods.”316 As was also true in
the Depression years, inequality of bargaining power between employees and
employers of late has tended “to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry.”317 A shortfall in aggregate demand that dampened the goods market was
undoubtedly a factor in the latest lingering recession.318 In short, Congress
enacted the NLRA in part to resolve severe macroeconomic problems, similar
to the problems facing the economy today.
Nevertheless, unions are often caught in the crosshairs of the efficient
markets ideal, in practice as well as theory. For instance, a classic
macroeconomic concept blamed on inefficient unions is the idea of sticky
wages—the tendency for wages to stay high when other prices fall.319 As a
recent New York Times blog described: “[T]he unwillingness of the employed
to lower their wages is what creates the unemployment. Instead of everyone
313 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (8th ed. 2004) (A Brandeis brief “makes use of social
and economic studies in addition to legal principles and citations.”).
314 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
315 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 611 (discussing replacement of striking workers
in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)).
316 29 U.S.C. § 151(d).
317 Id.
318 R.A., Recovery: Is it the Aggregate Demand?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 19, 2010, 6:40 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/04/recovery_1.
319 Sticky Wage Theory Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/sticky-wage-theory.asp#axzz2Lr2ot4tb (last visited May 4, 2013).
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receiving less pay, some receive none. That’s what makes unreasonable unions
so inhumane. They benefit members at the expense of the unemployed.”320
Another macroeconomic observation relevant to the NLRA is that establishment of the legal framework for labor management relations in 1935 led to
an explosion of union density.321 Leading labor economist Richard Freeman’s
analysis of a century of union membership demonstrated growth in discontinuous “spurts,” interspersed with periods of gradual erosion of union density.322
Such spurts have been partially due to either exogenous shocks to the
macroeconomy, such as law reform or political changes, or endogenous
responses of employees’ collective grievances and loss of faith in business.323
Freeman predicted that future resurgence of union density would likely be
induced by employee-driven bursts of union activity rather than any plausible
labor law reform.324 While scholars may differ on the impact of union activity
on the macroeconomy,325 there is scarcely a doubt that the existence of the
NLRA and the level of awareness and exercise of labor laws all play roles in
macroeconomic dynamics. Rather astutely, in dissenting to the final rule,
NLRB member Brian Hayes viewed the Board as seeking to “reverse the steady
downward trend in union density among private sector employees.”326 It seems
logical that any future spurts in union density will emanate from employees’
awareness of their labor rights.
B. Microeconomics of Unionization
At the microeconomic level, firms respond to union activity with classic
economic motivations. In theory, a firm makes economically rational choices
based on cost-benefit analysis; in the context of unionization, firms put
resources into preventing organizing drives in order to decrease labor costs and
enhance managerial discretion.327 Essentially, employers oppose the reallocation of their resources away from the owners of capital and toward additional
labor costs.328 The neoclassical view sees the union as an anticompetitive
monopoly on labor services delivering workers generous union wage premi320

Ben Schott, Sticky Wages: The Tendency for Wages To Remain High During Recessions,
N.Y. TIMES: SCHOTT’S VOCAB (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://schott.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/04/21/sticky-wages/.
321 Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth: Defining Moments and Social Processes,
in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 265, 265 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 1998).
322 Id. at 267–68.
323 See, e.g., id. at 278–80.
324 Id. at 288.
325 See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 779–81 (discussing a proud
intellectual tradition which advocates for freedom of contract and individual bargaining with
a minimum of government regulation, but noting the critique of neoclassical economics
acknowledging several “market failures” “all of which have relevance to the labor market
and the employment relationship”).
326
Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,037, 54,042
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104) (dissenting view of Member Brian E.
Hayes).
327 Kleiner, supra note 17, at 522.
328 Id.
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ums.329 It is generally accepted, however, that unions vary in the extent to
which they are able to raise the wages of their members, and pay gaps vary
with economic conditions.330 The union wage gap averaged around fifteen percent in the United States throughout the twentieth century.331 However, studies
conducted more recently have shown smaller wage effects of unions but greater
influence on job security, grievance procedures, and family-friendly workplace
policies.332 Many economists recognize another side of unions: their productivity-enhancing collective voice.333 Two theories explain this notion of voice.
One theory predicts that employees engaging with management as equals
results in greater input into the methods of production, while another theory is
that unions promote efficient expression that helps prevent the costly exit of
workers who are dissatisfied with their job.334
C. Institutional Economics and Labor Markets
In 1952, institutional economist John Galbraith coined the famous term
“countervailing power” to conceptualize unions as an essential check on corporate power.335 Countervailing power exists when unions (or other institutions)
push back against corporate power.336 Whereas the neoclassical ideal assumes
efficient and fair markets where union pressure inevitably results in distortions,
institutional economics337 recognizes that labor markets are “always and everywhere imperfect” and that they are a long way from the “finely tuned mechanism for allocating resources and rewards . . . in neoclassical economic[s].”338
Institutional economics readily acknowledges that unions exert market power
in labor markets, but this can be good or bad depending on whether firm governance and wage determination are efficient and fair or “problem-prone,
329

See, e.g., Bruce E. Kaufman, Institutional Economics and the Theory of What Unions
Do 6 (Andrew Young School of Pol’y Stud. Research Paper Series, Working Paper 10-06,
2010), available at http://aysps.gsu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/AYS_10-06_Kaufman.
pdf.
330 HYCLAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 352 (reaching this conclusion after generalizing over
200 studies analyzing union wage effects in the United States).
331 Id. at 353.
332 John DiNardo & David S. Lee, Economic Impacts of New Unionization on Private Sector Employers: 1984–2001, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1383, 1430 (2004); see also HYCLAK ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 355 (describing how unions might have had a greater effect on improving
“fringe benefits” even than they have had on wages).
333 HYCLAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 359; Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at
805; see also RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 3 (1984)
(proposing the two faces of unions: a monopoly face and collective voice face).
334 See Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 805.
335 GALBRAITH, supra note 18, at 114–15.
336 See Wachter, supra note 65, at 632 (union federations are pivotal because they offer a
counterweight to the largest corporations).
337 Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “institutional economics” as “a school of economics that emphasizes the importance of nonmarket factors . . . in influencing economic behavior, economic analysis being subordinated to consideration of sociological factors, history,
and institutional development.” See Institutional Economics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/institutional%20economics (last visited May 4,
2013).
338 Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 780.
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oppressive and unbalanced.”339 Comparatively withered private-sector unions
exert little countervailing power today, and the recent Occupy Wall Street
movement provides some evidence of pent-up demand to “counter” corporations.340 But even institutionalists don’t leap to the conclusion that greater
unionization is always for the best.341 As Freeman and Medoff put it:
“Because . . . unions do much social good . . . the ‘union-free’ economy desired
by some business groups would be a disaster . . . [but] [w]e also think that 100
percent . . . unionization would also be economically undesirable.”342
D. Information Economics
Underlying the notice-posting controversy is the larger issue of information in labor markets, long a fertile topic in economics.343 Imbalance in information between workers and employers is well established344: while
neoclassical economic theory assumes perfect information for market equilibrium, the real world is bedeviled with information asymmetries that result in
some of the worst cases of market failure.345 Businesses and employers who
clamor for laissez-faire labor markets are effectively seeking to benefit from
such market failure when workers lack basic information about their legal
rights. Therefore, communicating labor rights is a “modest step”346 to address
the information asymmetries in American workplaces.
Many scholars have studied information asymmetries in labor management relations.347 Particular need has been shown for information disclosure
vis-à-vis union representation.348
[T]he critical role of information—information necessary to make an efficient representation decision—has been neglected. . . . There are many reasons to believe that
the market fails to provide this information, especially in cases where it would be
339

Kaufman, supra note 329, at 49.
OCCUPYWALLSTREET.ORG, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited May 5, 2013)
(Occupy Wall Street “is fighting back against the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process”).
341 See Kaufman, supra note 329, at 47.
342 FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 333, at 250.
343 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. OF POL. ECON. 213
(1961); George J. Stigler, Information in the Labor Market, 70 J. POL. ECON. 94 (1962).
344 Dau-Schmidt, Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 782 (“The criticism of the neoclassical
analysis that economists rarely discuss, but that occurs almost immediately to everyone else,
is that employers generally have much more bargaining power than their employees.”).
345 See Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229, 258–59 (1986); see also Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate in Economics & University Professor at Columbia University,
Prize Lecture: Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics (Dec. 8, 2001),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf (Stiglitz received the Nobel Prize for his work on markets with information
asymmetries).
346 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54010–11
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104).
347 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94
VA. L. REV. 1, 69 (2008) (acknowledging “rampant information difficulties in the market for
union representation”); see also HYCLAK ET AL., supra note 13, at 190; Dau-Schmidt,
Employee Voice, supra note 19, at 781.
348 See generally Bodie, supra note 347.
340
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most critical. Considering these failures, it is worthwhile to explore ways of dealing
with this information gap.349

In NLRB elections for instance, the Board excludes certain kinds of information from representation campaigns but has not made efforts to include relevant information.350 An obvious solution to information deficiencies would be
a system of mandatory disclosure that would directly “force the information out
into the market.”351 Such mandatory disclosure should address specific information problems, be cognizant of other disclosure regimes, and avoid information overload.352
As discussed above, employee rights under various labor and employment
laws are routinely posted by mandate in American workplaces.353 Beyond
notice posting, some laws mandate or encourage training sessions to communicate critical information on topics such as health and safety or sexual harassment.354 Already under the NLRA there is authority for more intrusive
communication of worker rights—such as the “notice reading” remedy when a
manager must read a notice to assembled employees during a bargaining round
or in the event of an adjudicated unfair labor practice.355
Compared with other possible forms of mandated information disclosure,
the NLRB notice-posting rule is straightforward and rudimentary. The D.C.
District Court found the Board had not only drafted language that conveyed
information employees were likely to have been unaware of, but also had
“made the notice readily available to employers and made compliance uncomplicated.”356 Further, the court noted that increasing awareness of the law was
undoubtedly in the public interest.357 Any increase in employee awareness
resulting from the poster could hardly be considered “irreparable harm” to
employers.358 Given the deferential standard of review, the D.C. District Court
could not find promulgation of the notice to be arbitrary and capricious.
There are several key economic forces at play in the labor rights arena. At
the macroeconomic level, weak unions are unable to counter corporate power,
resulting in depressed wage rates that weaken aggregate demand and exacerbate recessions. At the microeconomic level, firms have powerful incentives to
349

Id. at 78.
See id. at 56.
351 Id. at 69.
352 Id. at 70–72.
353 See supra Part II.C.2.
354 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS IN OSHA STANDARDS AND TRAINING GUIDELINES 20 (1998) (General Industry Training Requirement excerpted from 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); CA Harassment Prevention
Training—2 Hour Supervisor Version, CALCHAMBER, http://www.calchamber.com/store/
products/pages/sexual-harassment-training.aspx (last visited May 4, 2013).
355 Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, Office of the Gen. Counsel to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 2 (Feb. 18, 2011),
available at http://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/GC%20Memorandum%2011-06%20(February%2018,%202011).pdf (First Contract Bargaining Cases: Regional Authorization to
Seek Additional Remedies).
356 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 2012).
357 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, No. 11-1629,
2012 WL 1929889, at *2 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying injunctive relief pending appeal).
358 Id.
350
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avoid any form of organization, from the mere exercise of concerted activity to
full-blown collective bargaining. Finally, there are significant information
asymmetries that distort labor markets in favor of employers, which can be
addressed by mandated information disclosures.
V. MANAGEMENT OPPOSITION

TO

UNIONS

Management hostility to unions was obvious in the challenge to the
notice-posting rule. Behind the litigation, employer opposition has been a major
factor in the decline of unions, and continues to hamper workers’ exercise of
their constitutional labor rights.359 Anti-union animus is the 900-pound gorilla
in the workplace. The legal arguments in National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB tiptoed around this gorilla,360 but a law review Note need not. It is
impossible to examine the purpose and procedures of the NLRB without some
recognition of the intensity of business animosity toward unions. This section
examines the extent and nature of management opposition to collective action,
the “union-busting” industry, and human resource and communications techniques that seek to manage employee relations without unions.
A. Management “Union Free” Strategies
The NLRB poster would hardly communicate labor rights in a vacuum, so
it is incongruous to conclude a government notice would infringe employers’
First Amendment rights. Not only would the NLRB notice share space with
many other government agency notices on federal and state employment
laws,361 but any message of workers’ rights would compete with vigorous management communications urging a “union-free” workplace.362
During the notice and comment period for the proposed rule, the Board
received many hundreds, if not thousands, of opposing comments in form let359

Warren, supra note 4, at 849 (discussing the reasons why employer opposition has been
a crucial factor in declining unionization rates and noting that American employers are
“exceptionally antagonistic towards unions”).
360 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 846 F. Supp. 2d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1629) (arguing that the issue is whether a rule is supported by
administrative record and whether it exceeds statutory authority; “[w]hether it’s a good idea
is immaterial”); see id. at 44–48 (explaining that a finding of anti-union animus was “an
important thing in the labor law world,” which opened up “a whole Pandora’s box of additional penalties.”).
361 See Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,006, 54,007
(Aug. 30, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 104); see also Edwin R. Levin, NLRB
Rulemaking on Employee Rights Notice: Is It a Double Edged Sword for the Unions?, 17
CUE NETWORK NEWS, Jan. 2011, at 4, available at http://www.saul.com/media/article/1070
_PDF_2891.pdf (“[S]ome employers might just hang the notice in the thick forest of all the
other mandated postings . . . where no one will bother to read it.”).
362 See, e.g., CUE: AN ORGANIZATION FOR POSITIVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, http://www.
cueinc.com/index.php (last visited May 4, 2013) (“When a Union Comes Calling[,] [u]se our
decades of knowledge to help you maintain your companys [sic] union-free environment.”);
Stay Union-Free, PROJECTIONS, http://www.projectionsinc.com/stay_union_free.html (last
visited May 4, 2013) [hereinafter PROJECTIONS] (this company sells union avoidance videos
with titles like: The Nightmare and Push Back Kit, claiming “[e]mployees that understand
their rights—including their right not to join a union—can be the most powerful force in an
ongoing effort to remain union-free.”).
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ters from human resource professionals.363 Such comments included the
phrase, “As an HR professional, I understand employee rights under the
National Labor Relations Act . . . .”364 These comments are ironic, because the
purpose of the notice is to enhance worker knowledge of the NLRA and an HR
manager would be expected to understand labor and employment laws as a
matter of professional competence. In fact, many comments showcased glaring
information asymmetries between labor and management, and revealed the
vastly different worldviews of managers. “If they don’t like the way I treat
them, then go get another job. That is what capitalism is about,” one employer
declared.365 “Belonging to a union is a privilege and a preference—not a
right,” proclaimed another comment.366 And one boss blustered: “If my
employees want to join a union they need to look for a job in a union
company.”367
In the modern workplace, employers seek to manage employee relations
with various management, communication, and human resources programs.368
The management literature is replete with studies seeking to improve the quality of employee relations and communications.369 A full discussion of manage363

See Proposed Rules Governing Notification of Employee Rights Under the NLRA, REGUYOUR VOICE IN FEDERAL DECISION-MAKING, http://www.regulations.gov/#!
docketDetail;dct=PS;rpp=10;po=270;D=NLRB-2010-0011 (last visited May 5, 2013).
364 Id.
365 Employee Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act: Comment on FR Doc # 201032019, REGULATIONS.GOV: YOUR VOICE IN FEDERAL DECISION-MAKING, http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;DNLRB-2010-0011-5548 (last visited May 5, 2013). A complete listing of public comments is available at Regulations.gov. The spectrum of feeling on
unions is presented in the comments, a selection of which are excerpted here:
LATIONS.GOV:

• “Where in your charter are you given the right to present a biased point of view that supports
unions?”;
• “Unions have brought our economy to its knees, and your notice is only sustaining the damage
they’ve caused”;
• “People do not need to be reminded of all this union bullshit!”;
• “While the notice is long and detailed, it completely ignores the right of employees to object to
paying union dues or fees for political purposes”;
• “I’m afraid that posting this document will promote more union organization attempts which
costs organizations a lot of money to campaign against”;
• “Expanding unions is not the best strategy for the economy”;
• “[W]e need to assure that all employees are informed of their rights under the NLRA”;
• “It’s the right of the workers to organize”;
• “Doesn’t seem like something to fear . . . if you believe in basic human rights”;
• “In my experience, workers are typically unaware of their rights under the NLRA”;
• “It is vitally important that workers know about their rights”;
• “While workers are entitled to protections, they are often not aware of them.”
366

Id.
Id.
368 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 70, at 120.
369 See, e.g., Zia Ahmed et al., Managerial Communication: The Link Between Frontline
Leadership and Organizational Performance, 14 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE, COMM. &
CONFLICT 107, 118 (2010) (stressing the importance of managerial communication to influence goodwill among employees, and recommending “establishing an environment of trust
through fair, free, and informal communication networks” and empowerment); Boris Groysberg & Michael Slind, Trusted Conversation: Use It to Power the Organization, 29 LEADERSHIP EXCELLENCE 5, 5 (2012); Adrian Wilkinson & Charles Fay, New Times for Employee
Voice?, 50 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 65, 65–66 (2011) (conceptualizing employee voice, and
367
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ment theory and practice in the area of employee relations is beyond the scope
of this Note—it suffices to acknowledge that there is a significant body of
literature and much organizational effort to manage employee relations. Many
employee relations programs are designed explicitly to keep workplaces unionfree.370 One guide to management discussed the importance of two-way communication techniques, such as open-door complaint procedures, top-down
communication to “show[ ] employees that they are a part of the company . . .
rather than ‘just employees,’ ” attitude surveys, and new employee orientation
that contains a “frank statement about why the company does not believe that a
union is necessary or desirable.”371 In a study of communication techniques
during an America West Airlines anti-union drive, front-line managers were
trained to control and promote “the company’s image while casting doubt and
negativity on the ethos of the Teamsters.”372 Using “open communication,”
managers responded to “employee concerns or comments . . . [with] carefully
constructed Q&A scripts strategically provided by the company.”373 Managers
were also “trained in the context of corporate optimism” and encouraged to use
“threat appeals” such as reminding employees of the dues they would have to
pay the union and the negotiation flexibility they would lose with unionization.374 Despite the aggressive strategy to fight unionization, Teamsters won
that campaign by a four percent vote margin.375
“[M]anagerial incentives to stop unionization are formidable because
unions raise wages and reduce profits.”376 The intensity of management opposition may “account for as much as 40 percent of the decline in private sector”
unionization.377 And hostility to union organizing is increasingly vigorous
despite low union density. Labor scholar Kate Bronfenbrenner found that
employer opposition to union organizing has intensified in recent decades.378
“[T]he incidence of elections in which employers used 10 or more tactics more
than doubled compared to the three earlier periods we studied, and
the . . . focus is on more coercive and punitive tactics designed to intensely
monitor and punish union activity.”379 Coercive and retaliatory tactics included
threatening to close and actually closing plants, surveillance and harassment of
workers, altered benefits and conditions, and increased discipline and firings.380 Bronfenbrenner found employer opposition to unions was constant and
new channels, vehicles and philosophies behind management practices and structures for a
formal voice regime).
370 For examples of union-free programs see PROJECTIONS, supra note 362.
371 LITTLER MENDELSON, CHAPTER 31: UNION ORGANIZING 2504–06 (2009), available at
http://wwwdev.elt.com/documents/Union_Organizing.pdf.
372 Lorelei A. Ortiz & Julie D. Ford, The Role of Front-Line Management in Anti-Unionization Employee Communication, 13 J. COMM. MGMT. 136, 150 (2009).
373 Id. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
374 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
375 Id. at 152.
376 Kleiner, supra note 17, at 535.
377 Id.
378 Kate Bronfenbrenner, No Holds Barred—The Intensification of Employer Opposition to
Organizing 3–4 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., EPI Briefing Paper 235, 2009), available at http://www.
epi.org/publication/bp235/.
379 Id. at 2.
380 Id.
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cumulative, and “some of the most egregious employer opposition starts long
before the union has even filed the petition.”381 Most anti-union campaigns
began much earlier.382
Management opposition to unions is aided and abetted by a multi-million
dollar union-busting industry of labor management consultants who “undoubtedly” contribute to the stridency in management opposition to unionization and
are a major cause of not only the growth in unfair labor practices but also the
decline in union membership.383 Such consultants help employers circumvent
the NLRA “through a vast array of union-busting tactics, implemented before
the union arrives and continuing until after it is defeated: tactics that are
designed, at every juncture, to undermine employees’ free choice of bargaining
representatives.”384
Scholars have documented “militant employer opposition to unionisation
[sic] in the US” which turns organizing campaigns into a war.385 Over threequarters of employers are reported to recruit outside consultants and law firms,
spending “between $2,000 and $4,000 per vote to defeat unions in NLRB elections.”386 Examining consultant literature, legislative hearings, and NLRB
reports, researchers have studied the adverse effects that a typical counterorganizing campaign has on supervisors, employees, and work.387 “Primed by
the consultant’s demands, supervisors proceed to ‘make life a nightmare’ for
workers considering unionization,” and “supervisors ‘spend virtually their
entire time interrogating employees and threatening them about their [u]nion
activities and [u]nion support.’ ”388 Specific employer tactics during union
organizing drives or contract negotiations include harassment or intimidation of
employees, instigating NLRB investigations, employer “captive-audience”
speeches, surface rather than good-faith bargaining, and termination of employees for union activity.389
As insidious as union-busting consultants may be, the “devil they know”
within the firm may be more of an issue. “The real problem facing American
unions . . . is not only the tremendous size and scope of the professional unionbusting industry, but the general intensification of management hostility to collective bargaining since the 1970s.”390 The stakes are high in union organizing
drives because the outcome of NLRB elections can be critical for employers.
One economist found that when unions barely won NLRB elections, they main381 Kate Bronfenbrenner & Dorian Warren, The Empirical Case for Streamlining the NLRB
Certification Process: The Role of Date of Unfair Labor Practice Occurrence 7 (Columbia
Univ. Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Res. & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 2011.01, 2011), available at
http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/working_paper_cover_2011-01-final.pdf.
382 Id. at 8.
383 Charles T. Joyce, Comment, Union Busters and Front-Line Supervisors: Restricting and
Regulating the Use of Supervisory Employees by Management Consultants During Union
Representation Election Campaigns, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 455, 456 n.8 (1987).
384 John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the “Union Free” Movement in the USA Since
the 1970s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197, 198 (2002).
385 Id. at 213.
386 Id. at 198.
387 Joyce, supra note 383, at 460; Kleiner, supra note 17, at 526.
388 Joyce, supra note 383, at 464.
389 Kleiner, supra note 17, at 528.
390 Logan, supra note 384, at 213.
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tained their recognition for long periods, but when unions barely lost elections,
there was scant evidence unions ever tried to organize the workplace again.391
“[E]mployers face a minimal risk of ever entering collective bargaining negotiations after a union loses a closely contested election.”392 Thus, intensity of
managerial opposition varies with the probability of union success: “If unions
have either an extremely high or low chance of winning an election, managers
would be less likely to use the organization’s resources to stop the campaign to
unionize . . . if the election outcome is uncertain, then the firm is more likely to
fight the union.”393
B. The Problem with Unions
Management opposition to unions is economically rational behavior but
such opposition is also understandable. Unions are not without flaws and failings. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act responded to
“labor’s excesses” including more than 5,000 strikes in 1946 involving 4.6 million workers and a loss of 107 million “man-days of work.”394 Unsavory memories of “big labor” inhabit the collective conscience. Even recently, the
America West Airlines campaign against the Teamsters used solid evidence of
unscrupulous practices, corruption, and kickbacks against the union, and the
notoriety of Jimmy Hoffa was frequently invoked.395 This is why the NLRA
protects workers from unfair labor practices committed by unions, as well as
those committed by employers.
Unions are the only major workplace institution that workers control, but
with only 6.6% union density, over 90% of private-sector workers are essentially excluded from the promise of NLRA protection. So unions are not really
meeting the needs of contemporary workers. Yet according to Freeman and
Rogers, the vast majority of union members want their unions and a third of
non-union members want a union.396
Despite the widely publicized flaws of unions and the unease that many members
feel about the role of unions on the national scene, 44 percent of private-sector American workers would like to be represented by a union . . . . The workers who want a
union but do not have one receive lower wages, are disproportionately black, report
particularly poor labor-management relations at their workplace and . . . the main
reason these workers are not unionized is that the managements of their firms does
not want them to be represented by a union.397

A key question is how employer hostility to unions can be so pervasive
when the NLRA is intended to pack some punch against animosity to unions.
“Anti-union animus” is the legal term of art for evidence of employer opposition to unionism,398 and employers wish to avoid the label at all costs. As
391

DiNardo & Lee, supra note 332, at 1386.
Id.
393 Kleiner, supra note 17, at 520.
394 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 40, at 67–68.
395 Ortiz & Ford, supra note 372, at 150.
396 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 70, at 97.
397 Id. at 117.
398 See, e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403–05 (1983) (an unfair labor
practice claim can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that anti-union animus
contributed to a violation).
392
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counsel for National Right to Work noted in oral arguments, evidence of antiunion animus was important in the labor law world: “[I]f an employer, in addition to committing a violation . . . is found guilty of anti-union animus, there
can be increased penalties, . . . a whole Pandora’s box of additional penalties.”399 Yet many employers appear to express anti-union animus with near
impunity.400 The answer to the question is that the labor law system is broken:
“[N]ot just broken, but . . . operating in direct violation of the law.”401
C. Cynicism and Distrust of Management
Management scholars urge power sharing—that is, involving and informing employees through their supervisors.402 And several studies of employee
loyalty have suggested that most workers were loyal to their work unit, immediate colleagues, and team leader first.403 But a large gap exists between workers’ sense of loyalty and their trust in management.404 Unfortunately, much of
the “state of the art” in human resource and employee communication techniques may be a waste of time and money if employees simply do not trust
management.
A study of how employees read corporate communications showed an
“unerring and persistent expression of anti-management attitudes by participants.”405 For a majority of employees, “ ‘us and them’ remains the central
discursive axis for discussing and engaging with managerial text and practice.”406 Organizations could be paying large amounts of money each year to
produce documents that either “further alienate employees or are flatly
ignored.”407 Another study found that a fairly large percentage of the
workforce was somewhat cynical, especially those in the profit-seeking sector.408 Research indicates that principal sources of cynicism focus on how
workplace policies are implemented and the self-interested behavior of corporate executives.409 “[W]hen employees believe that they are constantly misled
and taken advantage of, cynicism is rampant and overall corporate performance
suffers.”410
399

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 360, at 44.
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 378, at 24–25 (noting that “the overwhelming majority of
U.S. employers are willing to use a broad arsenal of legal and illegal tactics to interfere with
the rights of workers to organize, and that they do so with near impunity”).
401 Id. at 25.
402 David J. Therkelson & Christina L. Fiebich, The Supervisor: The Linchpin of Employee
Relations, 8 J. COMM. MGMT. 120, 122 (2003).
403 Id. at 123.
404 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 70, at 6.
405 Nick Llewellyn & Alan Harrison, Resisting Corporate Communications: Insights into
Folk Linguistics, 59 HUM. REL. 567, 589 (2006).
406 Id. at 590 (citation omitted).
407 Id. at 591.
408 DONALD L. KANTER & PHILIP H. MIRVIS, THE CYNICAL AMERICANS 63–64 (1989).
Given the popularity of television shows like The Office, Americans are likely as cynical, if
not more cynical, in 2013.
409 M. Ronald Buckley et al., Ethical Issues in Human Resources Systems, 11 HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 11, 21 (2001).
410 Id.
400
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Billions of dollars are spent on external consultants and internal programs
to attempt to bridge the obvious divide between workers and management. Perhaps instead of openly detesting and resisting the presence of unions—in contravention with established federal labor policy—employers should be
encouraged to accept the rights of workers to organize for mutual aid and protection. Far from posting a notice in an information vacuum, or infringing
employers’ freedom of speech, a single NLRB notice in a workplace would be
but a drop in the ocean of managerial communication. At the same time, notice
posting sends an important message to employers about long-established, constitutional law and public policy encouraging collective bargaining, freedom of
association and self-organization.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB has the statutory authority to require employers to post a notice
of employee labor rights and has proposed a reasonable notice rule. There is a
long, unquestioned tradition of posting statutory notices in workplaces. And
there is obvious need for 100 million private sector workers to know they have
labor rights protected by statute: only 6.6 percent of these workers belong to a
union, but millions more employees want some form of workplace association
and representation. Moreover, US employers have compelling economic
incentives to oppose collective action and many are openly and intensely
opposed to unionization, spending millions on consultants to keep workplaces
“union-free.” This Note has shown the most robust logical and factual support
for the NLRA employee rights poster: Employees must have formal, accessible
notice of their rights if they are to exercise them. Further, it is established U.S.
labor policy to encourage freedom of association, self-organization and collective bargaining for the overall good of the economy.
Courts and commentators have repeatedly urged the NLRB to engage in
administrative rulemaking and with this thoroughly reasonable notice-posting
rule the Board is entitled to broad rulemaking authority under NLRA section 6,
and a healthy level of Chevron deference. Denial of the Board’s reasonable
interpretation of a gap in its statutory scheme can only be viewed as a misuse of
the Chevron doctrine.
Alternatively, overturning the rule on First Amendment grounds would
grant employers unprecedented freedom to speak against unionization or to
refrain from speaking on the topic of labor rights. Most employers already
speak quite freely of their distaste for collective action. One NLRA notice
would be a mere drop in an ocean of managerial communication against
unions. But like the employer and trade associations who banded together to
litigate this issue, somewhere, some marginalized workers may have seen the
NLRA notice and realized that American law protected their right to concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection.
Unions and collective bargaining are part of the natural order of the industrial economy; a countervailing force against corporate excess, and perhaps the
last bastion against pervasive, enduring income inequality. The NLRA was
established to save capitalism from itself, by not only removing sources of
industrial strife and encouraging the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ311.txt

Spring 2013]

unknown

Seq: 45

NOTIFICATION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

17-JUN-13

10:37

981

but also restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees. When, as now, union density is historically low, and the NLRB is
beleaguered by successive, adverse judicial decisions, there is scarce optimism
for natural balance and equality between workers and capital.
The NLRA notice posting rule was a modest step to embody the ideals
outlined in the Wagner Act and ensure the future efficacy and success of the
NLRB. The 2010 rule was reasonable and necessary, and statutory authority to
promulgate it should be affirmed in the highest court. Whatever the eventual
outcome of the notice-posting rule, this rulemaking controversy will mark a
turning point for the Labor Board.
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APPENDIX A411

Employee Rights
Under the National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) guarantees the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively with their
employers, and to engage in other protected concerted activity or to refrain from engaging in any of the above activity. Employees
covered by the NLRA* are protected from certain types of employer and union misconduct. This Notice gives you general information
about your rights, and about the obligations of employers and unions under the NLRA. Contact the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the Federal agency that investigates and resolves complaints under the NLRA, using the contact information supplied
below, if you have any questions about specific rights that may apply in your particular workplace.

Under the NLRA, you have the right to:
• Organize a union to negotiate with your employer concerning your wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.
• Form, join or assist a union.
• Bargain collectively through representatives of employees’ own choosing for a contract with your employer setting your wages,
benefits, hours, and other working conditions.
• Discuss your wages and benefits and other terms and conditions of employment or union organizing with your co-workers
or a union.
• Take action with one or more co-workers to improve your working conditions by, among other means, raising work-related
complaints directly with your employer or with a government agency, and seeking help from a union.
• Strike and picket, depending on the purpose or means of the strike or the picketing.
• Choose not to do any of these activities, including joining or remaining a member of a union.

Under the NLRA, it is illegal for your employer to:
• Prohibit you from talking about or soliciting for a union
during non-work time, such as before or after work or
during break times; or from distributing union literature
during non-work time, in non-work areas, such as parking
lots or break rooms.
• Question you about your union support or activities in a
manner that discourages you from engaging in that activity.
• Fire, demote, or transfer you, or reduce your hours or
change your shift, or otherwise take adverse action against
you, or threaten to take any of these actions, because
you join or support a union, or because you engage
in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, or
because you choose not to engage in any such activity.
• Threaten to close your workplace if workers choose a
union to represent them.
• Promise or grant promotions, pay raises, or other benefits
to discourage or encourage union support.
• Prohibit you from wearing union hats, buttons, t-shirts, and
pins in the workplace except under special circumstances.
• Spy on or videotape peaceful union activities and
gatherings or pretend to do so.

Under the NLRA, it is illegal for a union or for the
union that represents you in bargaining with your
employer to:
• Threaten or coerce you in order to gain your support
for the union.
• Refuse to process a grievance because you have
criticized union officials or because you are not a
member of the union.
• Use or maintain discriminatory standards or procedures
in making job referrals from a hiring hall.
• Cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against you because of your union-related activity.
• Take adverse action against you because you have not
joined or do not support the union.

If you and your co-workers select a union to act as your
collective bargaining representative, your employer
and the union are required to bargain in good faith in
a genuine effort to reach a written, binding agreement
setting your terms and conditions of employment. The
union is required to fairly represent you in bargaining
and enforcing the agreement.

Illegal conduct will not be permitted. If you believe your rights or the rights of others have been violated, you should contact the
NLRB promptly to protect your rights, generally within six months of the unlawful activity. You may inquire about possible violations
without your employer or anyone else being informed of the inquiry. Charges may be filed by any person and need not be filed by
the employee directly affected by the violation. The NLRB may order an employer to rehire a worker fired in violation of the law and
to pay lost wages and benefits, and may order an employer or union to cease violating the law. Employees should seek assistance
from the nearest regional NLRB office, which can be found on the Agency’s Web site: http://www.nlrb.gov.
You can also contact the NLRB by calling toll-free: 1-866-667-NLRB (6572) or (TTY) 1-866-315-NLRB (1-866-315-6572)
for hearing impaired.
If you do not speak or understand English well, you may obtain a translation of this notice from the NLRB’s Web site or by calling
the toll-free numbers listed above.

*The National Labor Relations Act covers most private-sector employers. Excluded from coverage under the NLRA are public-sector employees, agricultural
and domestic workers, independent contractors, workers employed by a parent or spouse, employees of air and rail carriers covered by the Railway Labor
Act, and supervisors (although supervisors that have been discriminated against for refusing to violate the NLRA may be covered).

This is an official Government Notice and must not be defaced by anyone.
SEPTEMBER
T
2011

411 E.g., Employee Rights Notice Posting, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/poster (last visited
May 5, 2013).

